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A testing time ahead as Bush comes into his own

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

Governments in Western Europe understandably welcomed George Bush's victory in the presidential election.

He is a man they feel they know. No other member of the Reagan administration, apart from the outgoing Secretary of State, George Shultz, knows European problems as well as Mr Bush.

He has visited Europe on several occasions as Vice-President and knows most European heads of government personally.

Some Americans might see it differently. An understanding of European problems is not necessarily a plus in a country that views Western Europe with increasing irritation.

Many will recall the clash between the US ambassador in Bonn, Richard Burt, and a Democratic congresswoman from Colorado, Pat Schroeder, that flared up not long ago.

She said Mr Burt should represent US interests more emphatically rather than canvass understanding for the Federal Republic.

George Bush, who will be depending much more than President Reagan on cooperation from Congress, might be hit by a similar accusation from an America that sees the European Community as envisaged in terms of the 1992 internal market as an unwelcome rival.

Chancellor Kohl will have difficulty in dispelling US doubts about developments in the European Community on his visit to Washington.

Unlike the President, Congressmen are daily exposed to direct pressure by their electorate in largely agricultural or industrial constituencies.

Western Europe with its high agricultural subsidies seems to them to be an unfair partner. Bonn government subsidies for the Airbus, even in the final foreign exchange cover Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm have been guaranteed as part of the Daimler-Benz takeover deal, trigger fresh anger.

And both employers and trade unions are up in arms against Western European and Japanese products that are inundating the American market.

Even the best of friends can clash over cash. And that is certainly true of payments to offset the foreign exchange cost of stationing US troops in Europe.

Mr Bush will have no choice but to cut defence spending in his first budget, which is bound to lead to a fresh debate on the proportion of the common defence bill footed by Western Europe.

The Europeans, it was argued while the US Navy patrolled the Persian Gulf, for instance, are only too happy to let America do the dirty work, preferring to not to get their own hands dirty.

A President Dukakis would doubtless also have been confronted with this long-term clash, not to mention even graver doubts due to his international inexperience.

That is scant consolation because George Bush, despite appearing to be a known quantity, has yet to be put to the test in the Oval Office.

Will he show sufficient resolution and moderation in dealing with America's allies? That remains to be seen. Basically, Mr Bush is as much a dark horse for the Europeans as he is for the Americans themselves.

This, then, is the core of the problem: how independent and self-reliant a President Mr Bush will turn out to be.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher in his first comment noted that in the final weeks of his Presidential election campaign Mr Bush emerged from President Reagan's shadow.

The German Foreign Minister seems to have been impressed by the fighting qualities of a politician who succeeded in turning the tide of a campaign that initially went against him.

For Nato's sake we can but hope that this change will be permanent, outliving the cosmetic treatment applied to his image by his campaign staff.

Last but not least, the rest of the world was not inactive during the US Presidential election campaign. Gone are the days when the West was obliged to await its outcome.

Western European leaders have paid a succession of visits to Moscow this autumn, showing the extent to which Bonn, Paris and London have come into their own.

Foreign Minister Genscher even felt able to make a few disrespectful remarks about [illegible] list, by which the Americans [illegible] great store. It must not, he said, be allowed to block trade with [illegible]

In the debate now begun with Mr Gor[illegible] Soviet Union on the future of the [illegible] European house" Nato noneth[illegible] a US President who feels su[illegible]f and acts in close coordinat[illegible] allies.



Lots to talk about. President-elect George Bush (left) with Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Washington. (Photo: AP)

Unhappy memories of President Reagan at the Reykjavik summit in 1986 are still vivid: overnight and without consultation, he brushed aside a wide range of factors that had been regarded strategically essential.

The INF Treaty has been accepted by Western Europe despite dissatisfaction, especially within the Bonn coalition. More agreements are now on the agenda.

They range from balancing conventional forces, banning chemical weapons and, within Nato, modernising short-range nuclear weapons.

Progress on all has been varied. Talks on conventional disarmament are possibly the likeliest to be solved at the European security conference in Vienna.

Mr Bush has indicated that on these issues and on the halving of strategic weapons he will be following the Reagan line.

New summit plans are in the offing. The new US President enjoys the inestimable advantage of the ideological debate on a strong America now being over. No-one now worries about whether America ought to negotiate with the "evil empire."

On balance, President Reagan was able to override contradictions in his domestic and foreign policies by virtue of his personality. George Bush is not (yet) free from domestic constraints.

Gerhard von Glinski

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 11 November 1988)

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Kohl wastes no time in making views known

Chancellor Kohl was in a hurry to pay his respects to President-elect George Bush and to win support for Bonn's wishes.

He benefited from the news, during his visit to Washington, that Mr Gorbachov is to visit Mr Bush early in December.

That underlined Herr Kohl's request not to allow a standstill in East-West relations.

If he is lucky, the news of Mr Gorbachov's visit will have stolen the show — and the arguments — of Britain's Margaret Thatcher, who followed in Herr Kohl's footsteps.

Mrs Thatcher wanted to dissuade the Americans from making premature concessions.

There were domestic reasons why the Chancellor was so keen to strike while the iron was hot. He doesn't want to have to submit to pressure from his Western allies quickly to modernise short-range nuclear weapon systems stationed in Germany.

That presupposes swift progress on detente and disarmament. The short-term targets on which he and Mr Bush agreed did not include missile modernisation.

Bonn and Washington proposed instead concentrating on getting results at the Vienna CSCE conference and paving the way for talks on a conventional balance of military power in Europe.

Herr Kohl promised Mr Gorbachov support for holding a human rights conference in Moscow, but the Americans, like Mrs Thatcher, insist on Moscow first making a number of concessions.

Much though the Chancellor would like to play an intermediary role, Mr Bush and Mr Gorbachov have the last word.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 17 November 1988)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Problems of practical politics continue to bedevil Israel and the PLO

What really happened in Algiers on 15 November? The Palestine National Council did not recognise the State of Israel; it somewhat vaguely acknowledged a 21-year-old UN resolution as a basis for negotiation.

Resolution 242 refers, without specifically mentioning Israel, to the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region."

The PLO did not clearly abjure terrorism either; it merely referred to other UN resolutions sanctioning "wars of national liberation."

The Israelis are disappointed. Even left-wing liberal newspapers that have advocated a compromise for years have responded bitterly.

Ha'aretz noted that: "The PLO refers to *all* resolutions (on the Palestinian issue) and thus to the equation of Zionism with racism."

Hadashot comments that: "The PLO has made life easy for us by failing either to recognise Israel or to renounce terrorism." A historic opportunity had been missed.

Yet the glass is not *that* empty, especially when Algiers is assessed in terms of earlier documents in which the PLO really did miss one opportunity after another.

First and foremost is the infamous PLO Charter, which for 24 years has held forth for Israel nothing less than liquidation as a state.

Süddeutsche Zeitung

The charter refers to the "total liberation" of Palestine, to the "illegality" of the "Zionist creation" and to "armed revolution" until final victory.

Documents are documents and politics is politics might be the consoling message of Algiers if only the Israelis and the Palestinians had progressed as far as the two German states had by, say, the mid-1960s.

Basic Law, the 1949 Bonn constitution, and a number of international treaties still envisage a Germany not based on the existence of two separate states.

The basic principle is still that of a single German state with a liberal democratic constitution and firmly anchored in the West. But practical politics has long set aside these principles in favour of common factors.

This is here recalled to underline the self-evident fact that papers and politics can be poles apart.

Yet the fundamental problem facing Israel and the PLO is not the same as it was in Germany's case. It is a problem of practical politics, in which there is still very little progress.

Israel may be a pocket superpower in military terms, but it lacks the basic foundation of any kind of security: acceptance and legitimation by its neighbours.

The Palestinians may have all manner of sympathisers, but the state they have *now proclaimed is one they can only* be given by Israel.

So Israelis and Palestinians are inseparably interlinked. For sheer survival each needs something only the other can give.

Problems of survival are not mentioned in the manuals of diplomacy. Practical politics presupposes recognition and legitimation.

Even so, "partial moves" are no substitute for a break with untenable illusions. What is more, any such break calls for a new national consensus, as was the case on the brink of Bonn's new Ostpolitik.

Neither Israel nor the PLO has reached this point. Israel, as the 1 November general election results have shown, is split into two camps each of which blocks the other.

The PLO, as the Algiers conference has shown, is equally unable to adopt a new approach to its perennial enemy, with PLO leader Yasser Arafat saying the ball is now in America's court.

That is the *new minimum consensus* based on an old strategy. The aim is to persuade as many countries as possible to recognise the new would-be state as soon as possible so as to mobilise international pressure on Israel.

That is unlikely to make Israel readier to consider concessions. It is also unlikely to further the indispensable course of mutual recognition.

Not even the panacea of an international conference can relieve the Israelis and the Palestinians of their toughest task, which is that each must understand the other's national dream (and trauma) and *subordinate its own ambitions to the* dictates of realism.

This cannot be accomplished from one day to the next, yet the two sides could demonstrate tomorrow how the process *might* proceed.

The Israelis must stop treating the *intifada*, or Palestinian uprising, as though it were a *mere police problem. They must* appreciate that West Bank Palestinians have already moved a stage or two further than the PLO in Algiers.

The occupied territories are a "state in the making." The rebels *are in the* process of doing exactly what the Jews did when they campaigned against the British authorities in *1947/48*.

The PLO would do well to follow President Sadat's example. The Egyptian leader followed the dictates of ice-cold calculation and flew to Israel with an olive branch *in 1977, then came to peace terms with a* right-wing Israeli government.

Mr Arafat must convince Israel, not Malaysia, Madagascar and Bahrain, which have already recognised his "state."

Can he do so? All that can be said for sure is that time is no more on his side than it is on Israel's. The Israelis cannot *fight forever* the most powerful political force in the 20th century, the force of nationalism. Yasser Arafat cannot, for that matter, rely on the "international tribunal" of history. History will take its time; a *politician's lifetime is still subject to the laws of* biology.

Josef Joffe

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 17 November 1988)

The Western European Union gets two more members

Almost unnoticed, Spain and Portugal have signed an accession protocol to the Western European Union (WEU).

They will not become members of the WEU until next April when the parliaments of the seven old and two new *members have ratified the amendment* to the 1954 treaty.

But what is surprising is how little attention has been paid to the event. It is, after all, a matter of Western European defence cooperation.

The October 1986 Reagan-Gorbachov summit in Reykjavik reactivated a longstanding fear that Washington and Moscow might agree on a new international security system over the Europeans' heads.

The establishment of what Alfred *Dregger called a "European Security* Union" was styled a vital issue for the Old World.

Appeals of this kind have contributed toward progress in military cooperation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The documents setting up a joint Defence Council will shortly be ratified in Paris and Bonn.

In October 1987 the WEU approved a noteworthy "platform" on "European security interests" reaffirming Article 5 of the 1954 treaty.

By the terms of this article WEU member-countries — Benelux, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and, from next year, Spain and Portugal — undertake in the event of being attacked to provide *all the military* and other aid and support they can.

They also note that European integration will be unfinished as long as it does not extend to security and defence.

But there is another side of the coin. The reactivation of the WEU that has been envisaged for years has produced little in the way of organisational results, and there are no signs of when and how that might change.

The Europeans have yet to find a therapy to treat their defence shortcom*ings; all they have achieved is repeated* attempts to jawbone their way to an improvement.

That is largely due to a crucial question to which no-one knows the answer. It is how relations between a Western European defence community and Nato might be defined.

The common interest of all partners in Nato is in maintaining peace and freedom in view of the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Since the 1960s, when America became vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, the Western superpower has had a special interest in coming to an arrangement with Moscow.

As a result Western Europe has been afraid lest American security might be decoupled from its own. That was why demands for a second, "European pil*lar" of Nato took shape.*

It is doubtful whether a balanced partnership would be possible within Nato. A two-pillar structure would increase friction between America and Western Europe.

The imbalance within Nato may be felt to be a burden, but it does assure Washington of leadership of the Western alliance.

The Europeans have felt extremely snug in the role of the choir of America's allies: less prepared to arrive at decisions but always ready to voice criticism.

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Above all, there are no signs that Washington might be prepared to allow its "privileged relationship" with Moscow be upset more than it is at present by European objections.

A "European Defence Union" is seen by some as offsetting an American withdrawal from Europe. But the first consequence of any such wit[illegible] would probably be fresh dispu[illegible] Europeans.

Protected by the pax [illegible] they have been able to devis[illegible]ms of *cooperation since the* [illegible]e their differences in politic[illegible]mic and military clout.

The American [illegible]t bal-ance-of-power p[illegible] Europe. In a Europe l[illegible]evices it would all com[illegible]ain.

A decisiv[illegible] imbalance in Europe is [illegible]p of nuclear weapons. As [illegible]ails the risk of the user's [illegible] they are, inevitably, natio[illegible]s, with strict limits to coo[illegible]

[illegible] prospects of military coop[illegible]uld be in the conventional [illegible]t France, which is most close[illegible] with the Federal Republic both geographically and strategically, is increasingly losing ground.

Britain continues to see itself as an island and a special case. Economically it may have thrown in its lot with Europe, but militarily it banks on its "special relationship" with the United States as the *guarantor of its security.*

The Federal Republic's security stands and falls with the functioning of deterrence. Doubts as to the reliability of the American security guarantee cannot be appeased by the vague *hope* that Washington's nuclear shield might be replaced by a European one.

So in this respect too the two-pillar theory is misleading. It is a matter of keeping order in a European-cum-Atlantic house.

Whether it needs a fresh pillar is doubtful. What is sure is that the existing structure will be in jeopardy unless joint efforts are undertaken by those who live under [illegible]

Günther Nonnenmacher

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 19 November 1988)

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■ KRISTALLNACHT COMMEMORATION

Bundestag speech leaves a political career in tatters

The Bundestag Speaker, Philipp Jenninger, quickly resigned after the extent of the condemnation of his speech in Parliament this month to mark the 50th anniversary of *Reichskristallnacht* in 1938 became apparent. His speech *caused some members to walk out.* There were two principal objections. The first was that Jenninger, who is not regarded as a great speaker, did not make it clear that certain passages were quotations from the Nazi era and not his opinion. As one observer succinctly put it, the quotation marks could not be heard. The second was that the speech was more of a historical treatise about a national fascination with Hitler instead of an expression of sorrow at a black event in recent history. This analysis is by Eghard Mörbitz in the *Frankfurter Rundschau.* The second article appeared in the *Hannoversche Allgemeine.*

Words of consolation and comfort came Philipp Jenninger's way only from sources outside parliament: Robert Kempner, chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes *tribunal and not a man* who might be expected to say what he felt would be to a German Christian Democratic politician's liking.

He failed to understand the hue and cry over the Bundestag Speaker's speech to mark the 50th anniversary of the November 1938 *Kristallnacht*, when the Nazis staged a nationwide pogrom of Jewish shops, homes and places of worship.

Asked by a German journalist for his views, Mr Kempner, a lawyer who now lives in Switzerland, said spontaneously by *telephone he felt the speech was good.*

It was not just good, no: "I find the speech very good indeed." And he told a perplexed Herr Jenninger exactly that.

Michael Fürst of the Central Council of Jews in Germany also felt there was no convincing reason why Herr Jenninger should resign as Speaker. Had he not told the truth?

True, he had outlined what had happened 50 years "with the utmost brutality," but for the sake of young people alone that was surely something he must be per*mitted to do in all clarity.*

Fürst had certainly not expected a speech of mourning but an honest coming-to-terms with the dreadful events of 9 November 1938.

Strangely enough, people personally affected by the *Kristallnacht*, or at least those who were in a position to read the entire speech in their own time, mainly reacted entirely differently to Herr Jenninger's audience in the Bundestag and on TV.

Those whose views were necessarily based *on extracts seen and heard on radio* and TV after the uproar could only arrive at the one conclusion.

It was that the speech was a catastrophe or, as a leading representative of the German Jewish community put it, a "stupendous rhetorical faux pas by an unbelievably decent man."

Philipp Jenninger, who is well known in Bonn to be a poor public speaker, had meant nothing but the best.

The Bundestag commemorative ceremony was to his credit; the course it took was his undoing.

Remembering the superb speech by President Richard von Weizsäcker on the 40th anniversary of VE Day, Herr Jenninger as the No. 2 in the hierarchy of state was determined to outdo himself and show he was not only an honest and hard-working Speaker but also a brilliant speaker.

As soon as he realised that he had overstepped the mark and that none of his party-political friends, not even Chancellor Kohl, were prepared to lift as much as a finger in support of his continuing in office, he chose to bite the bullet and resign.

In his makeshift office in the fifth storey *of a former Bonn hotel Herr Jenninger, a* 56-year-old Swabian, began to draft his resignation.

Desperate from failure and thunderstruck by the reaction, he decided to bring his political career to an end and to resign from the Bundestag as well as from the job of Speaker.

It took level-headed parliamentarians, including SPD Opposition leader Hans-Jochen Vogel, to persuade him not to overreact.

He was persuaded with difficulty not to *resign as MP for Schwäbisch Hall, where* he polled 50.1 per cent in 1987.

Two floors below, Joseph Bücker, administrative head of the Bundestag, sat wondering whether the fiasco might not have been prevented.

He is neither politically nor by virtue of his job responsible for what the Speaker and his advisers write.

He had a copy of the speech on his desk at 8 a.m. on the fateful Thursday but as head of administration at the Bundestag he had other things to do than to read the 26-page manuscript for fatal errors of judgement.

Besides, what could possibly go wrong in a speech prepared well in advance and dealing with historical events?

Herr Bücker is hardly the man to whom Herr Jenninger would have turned for advice. There was Thomas Gundelach, for *instance, who was in charge of the Speaker's office.*

All that Herr Bücker knew for sure late that night was that the man two floors above him didn't deserve what was coming to him.

But he had often seen that when someone falls in politics no-one helps; many are only too happy to put in the boot.

Was what was going on two floors above just a macabre final act to gain time for CDU and CSU managers to organise the reshuffle?

Herr Bücker would not comment except to say was that glory can fade fast.

Surmise and speculation among journalists waiting until long after midnight to see what would happen had long ceased to concentrate on whether Herr Jenninger would have to go after four years and five days in office.

They all realised his position was untenable the moment neither the Chancellor nor other CDU/CSU leaders found a word of sympathy for him.

No-one tried to analyse his error of *judgement or support him in any way. The* effect was devastating. Politically Jenninger was finished.

All parties in the Bundestag sought merely to limit the domestic and foreign policy damage effectively and with as little delay as possible.

When rumour spread, mistakenly, that Herr Jenninger planned to claim in his resignation note that he had been left in the lurch by fellow-Christian Democrats, Gerhard Reddemann, a CDU member of the Bundestag's council of elders, impassively said: *"That would be the wrong justification* for the right move."

Herr Reddemann and his fellow-elders were already looking for a successor to preside over the Bundestag for the rest of its 11th legislative period and represent it in 1989, its 40th anniversary year.

Philipp Jenninger, 56, would have been the man if he had not increasingly isolated himself. He is a law graduate, an experienced parliamentarian, an honest man and a reliable democrat whose personal integrity is undisputed. He is also incorruptible *yet tolerant*

He tends to be short-tempered. Many MPs remember when in March 1976, as CDU/CSU parliamentary business manager he tried to demolish an exhibition of provocative political posters by Klaus Staeck at the Parlamentarische Gesellschaft.

But he is not, and never has been, a latent fascist or a covert anti-Semite. Despite his disputes with the Greens, who at times made him hopping mad because it was fun to do so, he did a good job as Speaker.

He swallowed many a deliberate provocation that would have made one of his predecessors, the irascible Eugen Gerstenmaier, explode.

Jenninger may look as though he is easy going but he found it far from easy to stay cool, calm and collected, as he had to for *Parliament's sake.* His close associates know how he often exploded. The last time was over bickering about extensions to the Bundestag.

Oh, dear . . . ex Speaker Jenninger.

(Photo: Sven Simon)

These dispute were one of the reasons why he began to increasingly mistrust even his fellow-Christian Democrats and other leading MPs.

As a man who is straightforward in both word and deed, he evidently failed to imagine that the truth as he saw it might prove fatal.

Yet he was right in stating, in his inaugural speech to the Bundestag as Speaker in 1984 that: "Nothing erodes the credibility of politicians more mercilessly than hypocrisy."

He certainly wasn't hypocritical when, on 10 November, he made his speech in memory of the victims of the *Kristallnacht*

But he had lost all sense of proportion and failed to appreciate the feelings generated by events which the Russian word "pogrom" is inadequate to describe.

The *Kristallnacht* pogrom and those that followed were not the usual propaganda campaigns and excesses against ethnic, religious and racial minorities known from history. They were state-organised *murder.*

Everything that is to be said on the subject in the name of and for the German people must be said with great sensitivity. Herr Jenninger knew this. He did his best. But it wasn't good enough.

Realising this, he did not try in his resignation speech to the parliamentary party to *shirk responsibility.*

He regretted having hurt the feelings of others, and he meant it, as he did in excusing critics who might not even want to understand what he had meant.

He has been a staunch supporter of reconciliation with the Jews in Germany and in Israel and is an uncompromising opponent of any kind of totalitarian rule.

This outlook is partly due to the difficulties his family had during the Third Reich, especially his father as an active member of the Centre Party.

Philipp Jenninger resigned *promptly* and honourably, without making excuses, which is more than can be said for many other former public figures who kept their eyes open for fresh jobs even as they came a cropper.

He chose to abide by the axiom he had proclaimed when he took over as Speaker from Rainer Barzel: "We mustn't preach standards other than the ones we ourselves feel bound by."

He did so in the name and with the approval of all members of the Bundestag. They would do well to heed them as unimpeachably as Philipp Jenninger, a man who ruined his political career with a single speech and unhesitatingly accepted the consequences.

Eghard Mörbitz

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 November 1988)

Speaker resigns quickly after his 'error of judgment'

Bundestag Speaker Philipp Jenninger deserves respect for not hanging on to his post and waiting until he was forced to quit.

He realised he had made a serious mistake — unforgivable in politics — in failing to appreciate the effect of his words in the context in which they were spoken.

It is amazing how ever-present the Nazi era still is. Other countries eye Germany keenly to see how its post-war democratic institutions are faring.

Words that can be spoken with impunity in other countries are out of the question here. In German families young and old are still at loggerheads over who was to blame *for the Third Reich's* outrages.

There are still Germans who feel Hitler was a good man (or would have been if he had only left the Jews alone) or simply refuse to believe what happened.

Philipp Jenninger did not want to make the past out to have been harmless. He *wanted to pillory it by suggesting what* Germans who were more or less active Nazi supporters may have felt.

He outlined from the Speaker's rostrum the views and ideas that had led to the downfall of the Weimar Republic and triggered the disaster of the Third Reich. He raised the spectre of the past, and that was a mistake. Some people may *feel he is* a scapegoat who has been sacrificed to international opinion. They are wrong.

He was mistaken in the way in which he described the German past. We Germans cannot *afford* a Bundestag Speaker who makes mistakes of this kind.

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 12 November 1988)

■ EUROPE AFTER 1992

Brussels goes on an offensive to allay growing fears of a trade fortress

Frankfurter Rundschau

The term "Fortress of Europe" has already become a familiar expression even though the thing it refers to, the formation of a Single European Market, does not come into effect until the end of 1992.

The term is particularly common in America. It pinpoints fears that the 12 member-states of the European Community intend erecting a huge trade barrier round themselves.

The Soviet Union is also looking at 1992 suspiciously. Chancellor Helmut Kohl found that out when he saw Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov in Moscow last month.

The European Commission has gone on the offensive to defend itself against these suspicions. Commissioners explain that sealing off the Community from trade outside Europe would not be in the best interests of the Community.

Brussels says that the Community's share in world trade, excluding trade between Community members, is as great as that of Japan and the United States put together.

It points out that the Community is bound by Gatt rules and keeps to them.

The US Congress, on the other hand, revises trade legislation every eight years or so. This means that only by legal contortions can the administration of the day put into practice Gatt regulations that have been agreed.

Nevertheless it is obvious that the removal of barriers between EC states when frontier controls are dismantled, will increase trade between EC countries considerably at the cost of many trade links with non-EC countries.

The investment boom enlivening Europe stems partly from the Japanese and Americans, who are pouring in the cash as a way of tackling the problem of 1992.

Japanese car and electronics companies are setting up production plant in the EC. But they are doing the same thing in America.

Japanese cars "Made in Britain," for example, will reduce imports via the long sea route from Japan, but that has nothing to do with possible future EC restrictions on imports.

Admittedly there is a special problem as regards Japanese cars. Italy, France and Britain apply differing, drastic import restrictions on vehicles from the Far East, based in part on voluntary agreements with manufacturers and partly on the dubious use of a Gatt escape clause.

In the context of the Single European Market Brussels wants to do away with these national restrictions for a "maximum market share" arrangement for Japanese cars which has yet to be negotiated.

This is not in conformity with Gatt rules, but the Commission argues that Tokyo should concede at least a half market share to EC manufacturers in its own domestic automobile market. These manufacturers have taken a beating from Mitsubishi, Toyota and others in the EC itself.

Only manufacturers in Euope of top quality cars, such as Mercedes-Benz, BMW and Jaguar, have been able to make any kind of headway against Japanese visible and invisible restrictions on the Japanese domestic autombile market.

Then individual EC member states have national import restrictions on a whole series of "sensitive products," almost all of them directed against Japan or East Bloc countries. The Commission is of the view that these should be dismantled by 1993 at the latest or they must be replaced by Community quotas.

As with all trade negotiations in the past this will involve dispute between the rather protectionist "original" EC states and the northern "free traders," and will end in a compromise being found.

Gorbachov's expressed concerns that the EC will cut itself off from the outside world are not to be taken seriously. The East Bloc countries have for thirty years made a fuss about entering into normal relations with the Community.

There are good reasons why trade between the EC and the Comecon countries is not greater than that between Switzerland and the Community. These reasons cannot be overcome as easily as all that in the agreements several Comecon countries have planned with the EC: with few exceptions industrial products from the Comecon countries are technically backward and so far their currencies have been non-convertable.

Hungary was the first country to conclude a trade agreement with the EC states after it was decided to take up normal relations with Comecon countries. In the Hungarian agreement, concluded in June, the EC committed itself to lifting gradually all existing national restrictions on Hungarian goods up to 1995.

Is this a concession to the East Bloc country that has gone furthest in dismantling its economic system to what is almost a capitalist economic order? When Czechoslovakia requested a similar accommodation the 12 member states said no.

Between now and the EC summit in Rhodes in December, EC foreign ministers will clarify whether and with what means the Community should promote the perestroika process in the East Bloc countries as far as it is able to do so.

London and Lisbon both want to follow a hands off policy and wait and see how the communist systems come along repairing their economies.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher leads the majority in the EC which does not shy away from a kind of development aid in the general interests of Europe.

The Commission has until now represented the view that "mutual economic advantages" must be observed in making concessions. This is a formula that the Comecon countries prefer to use.

The Brussels Commission takes the view that mutual advantage or "reciprocity" should continue to be the basic principle when there is still no international agreement.

The Single European Market, for instance, raises the question concerning the freedom of action for banks and also consultancy firms from non-EC countries.

According to the Single European Market principle an EC bank or insurance company should be able to operate in all Community countries, without having to set up a branch office in each EC member state.

But in future would an American bank, which has set up a branch only in London or Luxembourg, have the same right?

Bonn and several other EC governments are in favour of a generous approach here. The Commission points out in reply that in the USA itself a bank is not allowed automatically to operate in all the federal states.

Since Washington wants to push through international regulations governing the service industries sector in the current "Uruguay Round" of Gatt, the Community should hold back for a while rather than laying down all its cards on the table.

It is a fortunate accident that the development of the Single European Market is taking place at the same time as the "Uruguay Round" in Gatt, stimulated by President Reagan, and Gorbachov's perestroika in the East Bloc countries.

Within the Gatt Round, for instance, there is discussion of the US demand that all subsidies to agriculture should be dismantled by the year 2000, a demand that is supported by many developing countries.

This is a demand that neither the EC states nor the European Free Trade Association (Efta) countries could accept in its totality.

Nevertheless the Single European Market project calls for new financial arrangements in the Community, which makes essential a reform of EC agricultural policies.

The actual goal, about which there can be compromise in the Gatt Round, is the relinquishment of "production and marketing promotion subsidies for agriculture" in the industrialised countries. Reforms of EC agriculture policy, in place since February, are moving towards this goal in the long-term.

The Single European Market is giving political clout to the main concern of regaining industrial competitivity in high technology from the US and Japan. The Americans and Japanese are in no way model Gatt partners. For this reason the Commission is striving not to make a gift of advantages within the future Single European Market to both of them.

The Commission pursues a different line in relations with the six members of European Free Trade Association. The Commission points out that decisions about technical standards, rules of competition and macro-economic policies, difficult enough, are made by the 12 member states in Brussels.

The Commission points out to the Efta countries that they can participate in everything on the grounds of "our free trade relations which have been in operation since 1973," if the Efta countries make the necessary adjustments and introduce EC regulations into their legislation.

The Commission says that there can be consultations with Efta countries, an early exchange of ideas, a sympathetic ear to their views, but a genuine say in affairs cannot be conceded to them.

The sum total of revolutionary changes, which will be carried out over the next few years, not only due to the Single European Market but also due to international circumstances, cannot be seen in detail even by experts in Brussels.

Sealing off the European Community is unthinkable due to the free trade zone with the Efta countries and almost all the Mediterranean states, due to Gatt rules and EC obligations to the Third World.

The Comecon nations were of little interest as trading partners until now. Should perestroika lead to a reduction in the military threat, it would be easier to reduce CoCom (Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy) restrictions applied by the West on the export of technology to the communist countries.

Bonn and several EC partners are striving to make the first steps in this direction as a stimulus for visible moves towards disarmament among the Warsaw Pact countries.

Erich Hauser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 November 1988)

Parties of the left accept the inevitable

Socialist and social democratic parties in Europe have accepted the inevitability of a Europe without trade barriers from 1992.

But it emerged at a meeting in Berlin that not all supported the goal of European unity.

Many of 21 parties saw that national achievements, which should otherwise demonstrate the success of their respective policies, would be submerged in a greater Europe.

They now regard the Single European Market as a future reality and they feel that assent is essential so each country can cut future policy to exact maximum advantage from the new Europe.

They tried to do this in several areas of social welfare, employment policies and environmental protection, although their ideas were not identical.

All socialist parties from countries outside the European Community now have a problem. They all know that when the pull of the Single European Market is felt, they will have to adjust their legislation and economic systems to that of the European Community in order to remain competitive.

They certainly have no influence on the Single European Market. This has led some countries, even neutral Austria, to consider applying for admission into the European Community, if only to gain special provisions for their national interests during the long negotiations for admission.

It is an open question whether it would be possible for a country such as Austria to be admitted to the Community. Would it be possible to restrict membership to the EC to the purely economic sphere in the face of EC advances in political and military integration?

It must be remembered that the EC, during its own lengthy development process to a Single European Market, has hardly had any interest in including new members with special political interests.

The socialist and social democratic parties have tried to bridge this in their appeal for closer cooperation between the EC and European Free Trade Association countries. But the pressure to adjust remains on the non-EC countries.

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 8 November 1988)

■ PERSPECTIVE

The still-present legacy of the Last European War

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

Two world wars made their mark on the first half of our century; their aftermath is still with us:

Those who fought in and went through the First World War first referred to it as the Great War, then as the World War.

What they had experienced was a war that transcended all conventional ideas of warfare as thought out and written up by Clausewitz.

The concept of war was extended to accommodate the Great War as contemporaries had experienced it. But was the 1914-18 war really a *world* war?

It would be more appropriate to refer to the last European war. The reasons seem self-evident. The origins of the war lay in a clash between European powers.

The war was waged on European battlefields, and although a non-European great power, the United States, decided its outcome it was still a European war.

Marshal Foch, the French commander-in-chief, stressed that it was not an American victory.

While accepting US assistance he maliciously referred to it as "the auxiliary forces of our friends," which was an accurate description of the position.

The Americans may have been shipped over to continental Europe but their forces were auxiliaries, and no more.

The supreme commanders of the Entente wanted to be on their own. General Patton, the US commander, was unable to gain acceptance.

Yet despite this proviso the Great War was the "primal catastrophe" of our century, as George F. Kennan put it. It was a major worldwide conflict, a European war that shook the entire world.

Its causes were, in a nutshell, imperialism, nationalism and competition. Between them they put paid to a shaky system of European states.

This is not a viewpoint that has merely occurred to observers in retrospect. Back in January 1918 former Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg wrote to Prince Max of Baden, later the last Imperial Chancellor:

"The nations cannot be absolved of their sins as long as mankind does not resolutely turn its back on the circumstances that gave rise to this war and aims at replacing them with something else.

"Imperialism, nationalism and economic materialism, which have been the determining factors of the policies pursued by all nations for the past generation, set themselves targets the pursuit of which by each individual nation was only possible at the expense of a general clash."

Interests clashed. Conflicts occurred. The German Reich, ruled since 1888 by a coxcomb of a Kaiser, was in the throes of becoming a major industrialised country.

It had grown stronger than its neighbours, who viewed the new Germany with mistrust.

Conversely, the Reich felt it was surrounded by great powers that encircled and threatened it. Alliances were formed. France joined forces with Russia, Germany with Austria.

Political crises occurred, eight shortly before war broke out. War seemed desirable yet at the same time it was feared.

The large-scale European war was triggered by a clash between Austria and Russia. Both were nervous and overreacted, partly because they realised they could no longer cope with their domestic problems.

The state was threatened from within. In this state of affairs common sense was no longer possible.

As for Germany, the Kaiser's erratic behaviour had made its mark on foreign policy. He undermined all attempts to bring about changes in the political system.

Germany was increasingly manoeuvred into the position graphically described by Kurt Riezler, von Bethmann-Hollweg's secretary, in his diary. In July 1914 the Reich was isolated.

A month later the armies were mobilised and sent into battle, with Entente forces facing those of the Central Powers.

But gone were the days when it was enough to send 100,000 hired mercenaries under reliable leadership into battle, as described by Voltaire in Candide.

So were the days when peace and quiet were the citizen's bounden duty when His Majesty had lost a battle.

In September 1914 the Allies came to treaty terms in London. They were, initially, Britain, France, Russia, Serbia and Japan.

They were joined by Belgium and, in 1917, the United States.

Italy came into the war on the Allies' side in 1915-16, Rumania in 1916. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Spain remained neutral throughout the war.

The Allies faced the Central Powers Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and, from 1915, Bulgaria.

Major fronts

The major fronts were in Europe: the western and eastern fronts, the south (Italy), the south-east (Serbia, Rumania, Saloniki).

Important secondary fronts were opened up when Turkey came into the war. They included the Caucasus, Iraq, Palestine and, for a while in 1915-16, Gallipoli and the Dardanelles.

Warfare in the colonies was of no more than marginal importance.

No-one knew what war would mean in the 20th century and what dimensions it would assume. The crises that preceded it, the two Moroccan crises and the Balkan wars, had probably led to mistaken assumptions where a future large-scale war was concerned.

Total mobilisation began, having been made possible only by the degree of industrialisation achieved. War moved into new zones, changed its face, became a war of technology.

Technology mobilised the world and was the hallmark of war on land, at sea and, for the first time, in the air.

New weapons and forms of warfare were developed: the machine-gun, the flame-thrower, barrage bombardment. As recently as in October 1982 Adolf Heusinger, Bundeswehr inspector-general from 1957 to 1961 and a First World War lieutenant and company commander, noted in conversation that the changing face of war had not been realised.



Halleluja and on to war . . . elation in 1914.

(Photo. Ullstein)

There was only one weapon that really worked: the rake of machine-gun fire. But technical development progressed as the war went on.

Infantry was motorised, signals units modernised, tanks, gas, submarines and battleships, fighters, bomber squadrons and airships joined the fray.

The face of war changed entirely. On the home front too nationalism and imperialism mobilised nations to an unprecedented degree.

Total war was the slogan. It was coined by Field-Marshal Ludendorff, the "motor of the world war," to quote his close associated Joachim von Stülpnagel.

Yet despite this technical outlay (naval engagements, for instance) the initial German offensives ground to a halt and trench warfare reigned supreme from September 1914.

The war of attrition, battles in which superior equipment was decisive, began in February 1916. The character of the war changed yet again. Verdun will always remain a memorial to this madness.

A further change was that the individual soldier was increasingly relegated to a minor role. The unknown soldier, identifiable only by his dog tag, came into his own.

Arnold Zweig entitled his 1935 novel *Erziehung vor Verdun* (Education Before Verdun). It educated a generation to kill and to die.

The German supreme command sought to change the course of the war, as Ludendorff put it. But they did so in vain.

The Central Powers made a temporary breakthrough with offensives in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, but they failed to turn the tide. So did the 1916 campaign against Rumania.

Britain's long-range naval blockade of Germany along a line running from Scotland to Norway proved of great importance for the course of the war.

In May 1916 the German navy broke off the sole major naval battle in the Skagerrak to avoid destruction by the superior British home fleet.

In 1917 two events of crucial political importance occurred.

In January the German government declared total U-boat war, whereupon — in early April — the United States declared war on Germany.

It was the first major non-European power to enter the European fray. The United States eventually turned the scales in the Allies' favour by virtue of its superiority in manpower and material.

The second crucial occurrence in 1917 was the Russian revolution. Soviet Russia prepared to enter the political fray, sued for peace and signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty in March 1918.

Luck seemed to be on Germany's side again, but the spring offensives were a failure. On 8 August the German front was breached for the first time.

What then followed was a system of makeshift, tactical arrangements. The supreme command summoned the country's political leaders and sued for military bankruptcy, as Rudolf Morsey put it.

The ageing Reich Chancellor, Count Hertling, resigned. Ludendorff, aroused from his lethargy, demanded peace and armistice terms.

They were offered to the United States in early October. On 11 November 1918 Matthias Erzberger signed the armistice agreement near Compiègne. The last European war, also known as the First World War, was over.

Its repercussions shook the entire world. The Treaty of Versailles, far from resolving matters, sowed the seed of fresh conflict.

In 1920 the United States withdrew from European affairs. The countries of Europe were on their own once more and again began to mark out their spheres of influence.

Old states vanished, new ones appeared. Multinational Austria-Hungary was broken up and the Russian sphere of influence was limited to the east.

In South-East Europe a number of small and medium-sized states was set up.

The most important immediate consequences of the 1914-18 war were communism and fascism.

In Germany people were not prepared to accept the 1918 defeat. In the last year of fighting the legend of betrayal, the stab-in-the-back legend, made its appearance.

The Weimar Republic was not a satisfactory political system. That was why 1933 marked a crucial turning-point in German history.

A further war was heralded, preceded by a fresh explosion of German power. The Second World War ended with the atomic bomb, adding yet another new dimension to war.

Horst Mühleisen

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 11 November 1988)

TAKEOVERS

Daimler-Benz venture into aerospace goes ahead in spite of doubts

Daimler-Benz, which is already the biggest single payer of tax in Germany, is to become even bigger. Agreement has been reached with the government on terms for acquiring initially 30 per cent, and eventually a majority holding, in the aerospace group MBB. Daimler-Benz's turnover, already 67 billion marks, will increase to 80 billion. There were several factors which held up the deal: one was opposition on the grounds that the sheer *size of the new firm would produce both* political and social dangers; another was an issue of commercial monopoly; and another was MBB's involvement in the loss-making Airbus Industrie. Cartel offices both in Germany and the EC have now given the go-ahead for Daimler-Benz to pay about 800 million marks for its 30 per cent share in MBB, which will give it a stake in Airbus. Under the deal, the government is to make available about 4.3 billion marks to make good any losses the new group makes on Airbus through *currency fluctuations — civil aircraft are* paid for in dollars. This money is in addition to state subsidies for Airbus. Daimler-Benz will also eventually be required to take over the roughly 7 per cent government holding in Airbus Industrie. MBB stands for Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm. It was formed following a series of post-war changes which swallowed some of the most illustrious names in German aviation: Messerschmitt, Heinkel, Focke-Wulf and Junkers. This account of the latest Daimler-Benz acquisition was written *by Uwe Vorkötter for the Cologne* daily, the *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*.

There was tension in the air when the *Stuttgart-based Daimler-Benz* supervisory board met at the beginning of the month.

On the agenda was a topic that had *been the subject of dogged discussion* — before discussion stalled: a proposed takeover of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), the aerospace group.

*Around the table were 10 representa*tives of the investors and 10 workers representatives — plus the board's chairman, Alfred Herrhausen, who is al*so head of Deutsche Bank.*

This time, the talks lasted nine and a half hours. Then Herrhausen and Edzard Reuter, the Daimler-Benz boss, *appeared before the press to announce* victory.

The supervisory board had come out in favour of expanding the company, which is already Germany's *largest in*dustrial undertaking.

Herrhausen and Reuter said that takeover would take effect at the the be*ginning of next year.*

Never in Daimler-Benz' 101 years has there been a decision such as this that has caused so much controversy *both inside and outside the company.*

At least nine workers' representatives on the supervisory board were against the merger. They were led by the chair*man of the Daimler-Benz works coun*cils, Herbert Lucy. Another was Franz Steinkühler, head of IG Metall, the engineering workers union.

Just how the sole woman on the board voted is uncertain. Princess Christine von Urach, representing Daimler-Benz executives, kept her opinion to herself.

Nevertheless even if the 10 workers' representatives had voted against the MBB merger they could not have prevented the move. The casting vote is held by the chairman, Herr Herrhausen.

At the same time that the supervisory board was discussing the merger, the Bundestag was debating it in Bonn.

It is not often that the leader of the Free Democrats, Count Otto Lambsdorff, and Willi Hoss of the Green Party, agree. On this occasion they did — in principle.

Lambsdorff was concerned about the social consequences. Hoss, himself a former member of the Daimler-Benz supervisory board, compared the proposed merger with the amalgamation of the chemicals industry into the IG Farben complex in the 1920s.

The SPD is strictly against the merger. And among the CDU and CSU, only a few favour it.

The reasons for the opposition are various, but easy to understand. There are fears about the size of the merged organisation, mainly about the power such size would give. The Mercedes-*Benz trade mark, the star, would be*come a symbol for an organisation that controlled the armaments industry.

The Stuttgart firm would be the pre*dominant supplier to the German armed* forces. Everything would be in some part reliant on the group — the *Tornado* aircraft, the planned European Fighter *Aircraft, missiles, electronics.*

Central government would not only be placing orders but also handing out subsidies to the merged organisation. *The Bonn government, for instance*, supports Airbus to the tune of DM15bn. This project will in future be under Daimler-Benz supervision.

Daimler-Benz already has an annual turnover of DM67bn, employs 360,000 and is by far and away the largest taxpayer in the Federal Republic.

People worried about the merger are asking which politicians would dare to go against the wishes and demands of this organisation?

Then behind Daimler-Benz there is a financial institution whose influence on the German economy is enormous: the Deutsche Bank.

All this does not faze Daimler-Benz boss Edzard Reuter. He "respects" the massive public criticisms of his management and industrial policies but, "I do not share them."

Reuter and his management continue unwaveringly on the course they decided on three and a half years ago, turning Daimler-Benz away from being a purely automobile company into a technology organisation.

Daimler-Benz is a company rich in tradition and rich. It has been successful for decades, but has cut only a modest figure in the industrial world. The new course will make the company one of the world's leading technical and industrial organisations by the turn of the century. The car would still be the com*pany's most important product, but no* longer the only one. New business areas, particularly in aviation and space and inevitably in armaments, would limit the *company's dependence on the automo*bile, which Gottlieb Daimler and Carl Benz invented 100 years ago.

The first cautious step in this direc*tion was made in February 1985.* Daimler-Benz bought up truck manufacturer MAN's 50% share in Motoren- und Turbinen-Union (MTU), which manu*factures large engines and propulsion* units for aircraft, tanks and ships. Daimler-Benz already held the other 50% of MTU equity.

Just four weeks later the second, spectacular step was made. The estranged Dornier family wanted to get out of the Dornier company, deeply involved in aviation and space travel. Daimler-Benz acted quickly.

Lothar Späth, Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg, saw to it that the Daimler-Benz takeover went through without a hitch. At the time there were others interested in Dornier, particularly the Mannesmann organisation in Düsseldorf.

Daimler-Benz had hardly assimilated this second operation than the third came into view. In that same year, in 1985, Mercedes took over the majority in the electrical engineering organisation AEG, which had just come through the worst crisis in its history.

Before steps were taken to merge with MBB, Daimler-Benz took up a small holding in the French armaments organisation Matra, just five per cent of the equity.

This was a clear indication that Reuter and his advisers would not be content with just a national dimension to their organisation.

He said: "The technology organisa-



Refutes the criticism ... Daimler-Benz' Reuter. (Photo: AP)

tion with the automobile at its centre will be a European project." He added: "The aviation and space travel operation will go way beyond Europe and can only be advanced on a worldwide scale."

But the change from a car manufacturing company to a technology organisation has not been achieved without problems. Not just because of the acquisitions were the past three years the most turbulent Daimler-Benz has ever been through.

Although previously it seemed *that* nothing could go wrong, the Mercedes arm of the organisation has been running into trouble in a number of areas.

Series production of the medium class cars turned into a fiasco, because this quality product had defects; the planned test track in Boxberg came to *grief at the hands of the Federal Consti*tutional Court; the European Community did not go along with plans to subsidise the new assembly plant at Rastatt; *and there were squabbles among the* members of the board of management.

Professor Werner Breitschwerdt, head of the group until August 1986, *had to go. He was a sound,* pleasant technician, who no longer had control over the organisation.

Edzard Reuter's chance had come. *He had for a long time been in the back*ground pulling the strings, but he was careful not to blemish his reputation by making a bid for the top job.

Reuter's father was the *former Mayor* of Berlin, Ernst Reuter. Son Edzard carries an SPD membership card, but he is a charismatic manager and has never been active in the party.

He is on record as having said that an industrial undertaking cannot be managed from a social democratic or Christian democratic point of view but only well or badly.

Edzard Reuter, 60, runs the Daimler empire together with his deputy Werner Niefer. At first glance Niefer is the opposite to Reuter.

He is a Swabian, a man of action who has the nick-name "Mr Mercedes." He is the kind of person who, under his pin-stripped suit, has his sleeves rolled up to give a hand at the workbench.

Reuter and Niefer have been described as the "brains and the brawn" or "the head and the hand" of the organisation.

Reuter and Niefer have enormous tasks before them. The organisation hastily created through acquisitions, is not yet an effective single unit. A conglomeration of high-tech companies does not make a technology organisation.

Then the traditional car business is in

Continued on page 7

The Daimler-Benz empire
No. of employers and shareholding (%)

Daimler-Benz 218 820
Now approved: 30 %
MBB 38 500
100 %
Deutsche Airbus GmbH
80 %
AEG 80 500
100 %
mtu 17 280
53.5 %
DORNIER 9 680
Deutsche Airbus GmbH holds 37.9% of Airbus Industrie, the European concern.
INDEX FUNK 3314

THE ECONOMY

Surprise pick-up in investment brings back memories of the heady 1970s

DIE ZEIT

Just a year ago, when the economic forecasts for 1988 were made, a two-per-cent investment growth rate was the most that was expected.

In mid-1988 the employer-oriented German Economic Institute (IW) was still complaining that low investment was the Achilles heel of the Federal Republic of Germany as in industrial location.

Investment was sluggish, the institute argued, because "there is a lack of positive expectations of the future and of a sound system of incentives."

Now, not six months later, the Confederation of Germany Industry (BDI) says: "The signs of a recovery in investment are unmistakable. There has been a striking change in entrepreneurial sentiment.

Their expectations of business, pessimstic in the New Year, are steadily taking a turn for the better."

This sudden change is particularly surprising in its extent. After the stock exchange crash a year ago hopes of a respectable growth rate, let alone of higher investment, plummeted.

Who was going to order new plant and equipment when the sales prospects for the goods they would produce were deteriorating?

The German Banking Association cautiously indicated the change in August, saying:

"The deep sense of insecurity that befell the readiness of business to invest *after the stock market turbulence of au*tumn last year seems to have been dispelled."

In October, on the anniversary of the *stock market crash*, Otto Schlecht, state secretary at the Economic Affairs Ministry in Bonn, could say with an easy conscience: "It has all been different *from what we were expecting.*"

Since early summer, if not earlier, there has been nothing less than a wave of economic and industrial investment *in the Federal Republic.*

The Bundesbank has noted an "increase in demand by leaps and bounds" for capital goods and inferred a "grow*ing readiness to invest on the part of* domestic companies."

Even the construction industry, which seemed set for stagnation in the New Year, *is benefiting handsomely* from this sudden spate of business activity.

In the first half of 1988 German firms *invested DM138.5bn, or 12.5 per cent* more than in the corresponding period last year, while investment in construction was up 15 per cent.

The autumn review of the economic outlook by the country's five leading economic research institutes expects investment to be up by over five per cent for the year as a whole.

That is not the end of the good news. A survey of 15,000 companies by the Standing Conference of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT) arrived in mid-October at the encouraging conclusion that:

"The clear improvement in readiness to invest that has occurred in the course of 1988 will continue in the year ahead."

On closer scrutiny this will be seen as the reversal of a long-term trend. Not since the mid-1960s has there been such a substantial increase in overall gross investment as in the first six months of 1988 (11 per cent, including the public sector).

Nominal increases of five per cent per annum have been the pick of the pack for about 20 years. In real, inflation-adjusted terms investment has even been known to decline, as in 1985.

By international standards the per*formance of German industry was* unspectacular. For the past five years, the Westdeutsche Landesbank recently noted, "the dynamism of investment has *been decidedly lower than in most other* countries."

Not only Japan and the United States had better track records. So did Britain, Italy or Spain.

Poor business was not the reason why German industry was reluctant to invest. Profits have broken one record after another for years, while wages and salaries have lagged well behind them.

Yet German entrepreneurs preferred to invest in securities. They were less risky — and usually more profitable — than plant and equipment.

Besides, since the early 1980s German capital has increasingly been invested abroad, mainly to do the growing international division of labour justice.

In 1986 direct investment abroad by German firms totalled DM29bn, or twice the 1982 figure.

Heated debate in recent months as to the standing of the Federal Republic as an industrial location seems to have persuaded decision-makers that investment conditions here are none too bad.

Irrational arguments ranging from accusations of political uncertainty and red tape and fears of social unrest seem in particular suddenly to have been forgotten. Investment is considered worthwhile once more.

The crucial factor in this change of mind has been that profit expectations have improved yet again. In July the Dresdner Bank forecast a further 5.5-per-cent increase in earnings from entrepreneurial activity and assets this year.

That would step up the pace of an impressive improvement in profits sustained since 1982.

Profits are an essential but not the sole or sufficient prerequisite for investment. As long as output can be increased using existing machinery, as was the case *for years*, investment in plant and equipment makes little sense.

Yet here too the current conditions are virtually ideal. The BDI, which can*not be suspected of painting the picture* in too rosy terms, says:

"Capacity utilisation has reached a peak in the growth cycle that has been *sustained since 1982.*"

Hans-Günther Süsser of the Economic Affairs Ministry says the last time the figures were as encouraging as they are today was in the early 1970s.

In 1973 capacity utilisation in manufacturing industry was 87.1 per cent. In 1979 it was 84.7, in September 1988 87.4 per cent.

So manufacturers who want to step up production will in many cases have no choice but to invest in new machinery and may even have to hire extra staff

There is a further argument against ploughing profits back into the business that no longer applies. Interest rates have declined to a level at which invest*ing in securities is no longer the best* bet; productive investment now seems likely to net a higher return.

"At all events," Herr Susser says, "the interest earned on capital investment is higher once more than the real return on bonds and other debt instruments."

As long ago as in mid-1986 the IW announced that investment was worthwhile once more — due to lower interest rates and higher profits.

But potential investors were chary of risking their cash and have only lately developed a taste for capital investment.

This may be due to a realisation that investment is a sound preparation for the European *internal* market. That would certainly seem to be indicated by the findings of the DIHT survey.

Alongside cutting costs, product in*novation is the second major motive* for investment in what will now be 1989. Then comes capacity expansion, followed by environmental protection.

This success story still has one major drawback: continued high unemployment. The DIHT concludes from its findings that there is a ray of hope for the labour market.

Thirteen per cent of companies polled planned to hire extra staff next year, while 72 per cent said they would be maintaining present staff levels.

"There have not been such high figures since the early 1980s," the DIHT says.

Yet the labour supply is on the increase too, due in part to ethnic German migrants from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. As a result the unexpected increase in investment is unlikely to be enough to bring about any substantial change in employment trends.

Even if there were 150,000 more jobs at the end of December than a year ago, the number of people out of work would be just as high.

Klaus-Peter Schmid

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 11 November 1988)

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need of financial support. In the past few months the competition in Munich, BMW, has pulled ahead of Mercedes in Stuttgart with new models. Confidently Edzard Reuter said: "We shall reply. Just wait a little. We have rolled up our sleeves."

That is necessary for undivided admiration for the Stuttgart organisation is no longer a matter of course, not even in Stuttgart.

When the builders of the new Daimler administrative building in Möhringen, a Stuttgart suburb, placed a particularly large and obtrusive Mercedes star over the *headquarters, there was considerable local* protest.

Edzard Reuter acted sensitively. He took a close look at the star and ordered *the installation of a dimmer which made it* possible to regulate its luminosity. The Mercedes star is now shining not quite so brightly,

Uwe Vorkötter

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 15 November 1988)

■ BUSINESS

An increasing demand for women in management

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

Women are more stable, tougher, more stress-resistant and less *touchy than they used to be.*

These days, companies expect women not only to occupy management positions, but also to be the trendsetters in a new style of management: a cooperative, overall, intuitive approach which, it is hoped, will be the key to success.

The impression at the Women and Business in the 1990s congress in Berlin was that women are increasingly in demand in managemnt.

"Business needs more women's know-how," said Klaus Murmann, president of the Federal Employers' Association.

As Germany developed from an industrial to a communication society qualities that used to be belittled as "typical of women," such as knowledge of human nature, versatility, flexibility and a ready ability to make contacts, were suddenly being reappraised as strong points.

Teamwork, staff motivation and an ability to grasp the overall context would be more crucial than ever in management *tomorrow and men had yet to* learn this "gentle style of leadership."

The low percentage of women in management was "a waste of *leadership* potential the economy cannot afford," Herr Murmann said.

There are other, less exalted reasons for the trend toward women. A survey by the Prognos market research institute, Basle, forecasts that by the year 2000 an extra 550,000 managerial staff will be needed in German companies.

The low birth-rate years will mean that there will not be enough male school leavers to meet the demand.By the end of the century. there will be 440 per cent fewer 20- to 29-year-olds and 30 per cent fewer university graduates than now.

This. said Bonn Family Affairs Minister Rita Süssmuth, was a gap that could only be bridged "if women are groomed to become managers. " That meant that business — and society in general — would need to consider ways of reconciling the interests of career and family.

"To confront women with a choice between children or a career is to set limits to the future," she told the congress.

Reality is still remote from these visions of the future. Fifty-three per cent *of women in Germany may work for a* living, as against 46 per cent in the early 1970s, but by international standards that is *none too impressive.*

In the United States 10 per cent more women are employed. In Sweden the figure is 25 per cent higher.

What is more, nearly 90 per cent of working women in the Federal Republic have part-time jobs. They mainly do poorly-paid jobs with poor career prospects — *in textiles or the health service,* for instance. When jobs are axed theirs are the first to go.

The difference between men and women is even more striking higher up the career ladder. Forty per cent of working Germans are women yet in management they make up a mere four per cent and in company boardrooms less than one per cent. There are 2,000 women among the 52,000 people in West German management.

University professors in the senior C 4 grade are 98-per-cent men. Even in the trade unions, Christiane Bretz of the Berlin executive of the DGB, Germany's Düsseldorf-based trade union *confederation,* "women are as underrepresented at the top as they are in industrial management."

Here too, other countries have a better track record. In the United States, where quotas apply and fines are imposed *on employers who don't hire the* mandatory percentage, 37 per cent of managerial staff are women.

Even in neighbouring France, which is hardly a byword for women's liberation in everyday life, one manager in 12 is a woman.

Why is it that women in the Federal Republic seldom make it to the top in their careers? Does social prejudice keep them out? Or do they lack the qualifications and the determination to make good?

Qualification can no longer count against them. Sixty-three per cent of working women have learnt a trade or profession, and their numbers are increasing. There is little to choose between the sexes among the young in this respect.

Thirty-five per cent of economics, business studies and law students are women and their grades are. on average. *better than those of their male counter*parts.

Yet, coincidence or not, when it became clear *that only women applicants* had the qualifications required for appointments to the bench, standards were lowered to enable men to continue to qualify as judges.

Women seem to have no lack of determination to make good either. In a survey carried out by a Munich market research institute for *Brigitte*, a mass-circulation women's magazine. 70 per cent of men and women said having children was their main aim in life.

Yet only 12 per cent of women felt children, housework and the church (in German the three Ks, a traditional triad of women's role in life) were enough to keep them busy and satisfied for life.

Yet there simply aren't enough crèches or kindergartens. There aren't *enough further training facilities* suitable for women who have given up work for a while to have children.

*Women can still feel sure they are go*ing to have such difficulty in finding a job once the children are at school that *many eventually decide either to have* no children at all or at least to have fewer of them.

The resistance they face on the way to the top is subtle and persistent. "Women may have gained in importance as workers and consumers," said sociologist Camilla Krebsbach-Gnath. "but that must not be mistaken for equal rights."

She used to be a member of the research staff of the Battelle Institute, Frankfurt. and now works in project management at the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft.

As long as politics and industry did not show the courage women had already shown and failed to change the framework conditions, she said, the situation would not change substantially in the 1990s.

Resistance to women in senior management unsurprisingly comes mainly from male-dominated senior management itself.

One speaker noted that applicants for management jobs were preferred to have straightforward careers, with no kinks in their curriculum vitae. Few women could comply with this require*ment. and lateral entry was frowned on.*

"Power is the crux of the matter," said Carola von Braun, commissioner for *women's affairs to the Berlin Senate and* organiser of the congress. "Women will only be given career training for as long as men *feel it is useful* for them to be trained."

Men were simply afraid of losing their job and status, afraid of being a failure, Frankfurt management consultant Winfried Bauer *told the almost all-female* congress.

They were opposed to changes that *might jeopardise their position,* which was why mediocrity and routine had come to the fore in German firms, and as long as the handful of women at the top behaved like men this vicious circle would continue to operate.

Herr Bauer was not alone at the Berlin congress in calling for "greater courage to be feminine," or, to use a slogan that makes sense in English, for "women's pride."

This is a conflict many women — especially women who might be in a position to do so — no longer want to be burdened with.

It is no coincidence that one new firm in three is set up by a woman and that nearly one self-employed person in four is a woman.

Even in the United States, where *strictly enforced quotas had ensured* that the percentage of women in management had increased substantially of *late,* many women were *now going it* alone, said sociologist Ariane Berthoin-Antal.

A quantitative increase in the number of women in management was not enough. Qualitative changes were also needed in many respects.

In the final analysis times are changing. Women's political influence — as voters — is steadily increasing, and a foreseeable shortage of qualified management trainees will force the business community to rethink.

In Switzerland it has already done so. Three years ago an Action not Words campaign was launched to help women qualify and gain promotion. Fifty Swiss firms are now affiliated

A similar project was launched in the Federal Republic at the beginning of September, but until its work has any effect the "weaker sex" seem sure to have to fend for themselves.

"*Find yourself a mentor,*" *said the* personnel director of a Swiss bank. Frau Krebsbach-Gnath called on women to *set up networks to counteract the influ*ence of the old boys' network.

Yet in the final analysis men must also be prepared to accept the idea of change. "As long as we fail to interest men in attending our congress we will fail to interest them in what interests us."

A quick look at the floor clearly indicated the status quo. There were about 400 women present but only a token 25 men.

Margarita Chiari

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 11 November 1988)

■ TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Kopernikus ready to set up post office in space

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

Germany's first all-German telecom satellite, *Kopernikus,* is ready for launching.

It is in a dust-free chamber at the Erno division of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, the aerospace group, in Bremen (Copernicus was a Prussian atronomer who lived from 1473 to 1543).

It has taken over 400 rocket and telecom specialists nearly five years to complete the first capsule of a three-satellite space telecom system in the DM1bn project.

Kopernikus is scheduled to be put into orbit next spring by a new version of the Ariane 4 European launcher rocket.

The Bundespost has *decided to use* the latest satellite technology in space to improve telecommunications in Ger*many and West Berlin.*

The DFS-Kopernikus telecom system (DFS stands for *Deutscher Fernmelde-Satellit,* or German telecom satellite) will improve existing telecom links and make it possible to offer new services.

New, flexible and comprehensive telecom links will connect all localities in the Federal Republic. What is more. they will include full telecom services to and from West Berlin without, as at present, using cable and directional radio through the East Germany.

Bundespost spokesman Günther Bruchmüller says the DM800m-plus satellite system (not including launching costs) will be an all-rounder.

During an active life of an estimated 10 years it will relay not only telephone, telex and other Bundespost telecom services to and from West Berlin; it will also relay TV programmes, commercial data and an experimental new frequency.


The system consists of two parts, the space segment and the ground segment. The space segment will comprise three *identical satellites.*

Two of them will appear to hover in geostationary orbit above the equator; *the third will be kept in reserve on terra* firma.

DFS 1 will be launched by Ariane 4, *the European launcher rocket; DFS 2,* its identical twin, will be launched at the end of next year.

It will serve as an immediately available substitute for DFS 1 and add swift extra capacity to the entire system if needed. Each launching will cost about DM100m.

Kopernikus, says DFS project manager Helmut Mahner of Siemens, the company leading the manufacturing consortium, is a significant milestone in telecommunications within the Federal Republic.



One, two, three, four, testing. Kopernikus' antenna system being tested in a special dust-free chamber. (Photo: ANT)

Each of the three satellites runs on roughly 1,500 watts and in the 12/14, 11/14 and 20/30 gigahertz frequency ranges.

Power is generated by 19,656 solar cells on twin generator panels with a wingspan of 15.40 metres (50ft 6in) and *facing the Sun.*

While the satellite is not facing the Sun power will be supplied by twin bat*teries on board the satellite.*

Each satellite will incorporate 11 active transponders to relay the various data. Five will relay TV programmes to and from cable networks, with each transponder designed to handle one or two programmes.

Two transponders will handle the new commercial data network designed to handle a large quantity of digitalised data at a speed of up to two megabites per second.

The commercial data relayed will consist largely of data to and from large-scale computers and video conference relays.

Three transponders will handle the so-called Berlin section, including one to relay radio and TV programmes between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Two TV programmes can be relayed simultaneously.

The other two Berlin transponders will relay up to 2,000 telephone calls and other postal telecom services such as telex and telefax.

New ground

The Bundespost will break new *ground with what it has dubbed the* technology transponder, which will handle telecommunications in the as yet un*used 20-30 gigahertz range.*

On the ground a total of 34 ground stations will maintain links between satellite *and users, electronically amplify*ing weak signals received from the satellite and relaying them via cable or Bundespost directional radio to their destination.

The Kopernikus system will include the use of proposed mobile ground stations to ensure greater flexibility.

Two central ground stations with transmission and reception acrials 18 and 11 metres (59 and 36ft) in diameter are in Usingen, near Frankfurt am Main, and in West Berlin.

The Oberpfaffenhofen, Munich, GSOC, or ground space operations centre, will monitor and control the satellite from take-off until it reaches its final orbital position. The GSOC is run by the DFVLR aerospace research establishment.

Dieter Reck, deputy project manager at MBB-Erno, breathes a sigh of relief. "*Kopernikus,*" *he says,* "is *now in* the dust-free clean room in Bremen and needs only to be put through final tests."

DFS 1, weighing 1.4 tonnes, will then be vacuum-packed for safety's sake.

After blast-off the satellite will separate from the Ariane rocket at an altitude of 200km (125 miles), by which time its 4.15 metres (9ft 6in) will be travelling in an elliptical orbit

It will take roughly 23 days to position at the prescribed altitude of roughly 36,000km (22,500 miles) and a further 61 days to be put through its functional paces.

So it will be roughly three months before it is available for initial services including Berlin services and TV relay

About two months later the so-called technology transponder will be taken into service in the 20-30 gigahertz range.

The commercial data network will not be fully operational from the users' viewpoint until 275 days after launching.

DFVLR's Hans-Leo Richter in Porz-Wahn, Cologne, says what at first glance seems to be a heavy investment in the satellite system is sensibly invested.

"Kopernikus," he says, "reflects the high performance of the German telecom and aerospace industries. A future-oriented telecom system is indispensable if our modern industrial so*ciety is to stay competitive.*"

The Bundespost awarded the contract to develop and manufacture this all-Ger*man satellite system in 1983. It went to a* consortium led by Siemens of Munich.

Other members are ANT of Backnang, *Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm* and Erno, Standard Elektrik Lorenz and a number of suppliers.

ANT and MBB-*Erno* are in charge of satellite development and construction, with which a highly qualified staff of about 400 specialists are associated.

Bundespost Minister Christian Schwarz-Schilling is working on the assumption that everything will go ahead as planned.

"From mid-1989 it will be the first German post office in outer space," he says. "It may never have a visitor but it will have thousands of customers."

Jochen Wagner

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 11 November 1988)

■ FILMS

Festival with Japanese touch and a scoreless draw



The Hof Film Festival, traditionally a show-window for the latest from the German film industry and special international productions, included this year a workshop on the little known Japanese director Seijun Suzuki.

Suzuki was born in Tokyo in 1923. Some of his films have been shown outside *Japan before in film museums and* at special festivals. He acquired the reputation for being a brilliant director of films dealing with the erotic and violence because of his concentration on acts of brutality and sex. His works astonished and cast a spell over audiences.

They were also bewildered by their formal beauty, by their narrative appeal and by their attack on the conventions *of cinematic presentation.*

He experimented with the rhythm and colour of the images in his productions. His gangster films are among the most stylish to be seen in the art of the film.

But this particular style was controversial in the 1960s, even in his own *production company* Nakkatsu. The studio head said that the public could not understand his films. In 1967 Suzuki was shown the door and the studio head even tried to put a stop to a workshop on his films, scheduled to be staged in Tokyo.

Suzuki's dismissal aroused heated reactions. Directors such as Oshima led a campaign for creative freedom for film directors.

When his films were eventually screened Suzuki's innovative style was wildly applauded by a public which had been denied *seeing* them.

Only 12 of more than 40 films he made have been preserved. Seven of them were shown at this year's Hof Festival, the 22nd, including his best gangster films dating from the 1960s.

It goes without saying that it is to be hoped that these films will get general *distribution in cinemas in the* Federal Republic after their screening in Hof.

The films shown were *Detective Bureau 23 — Go to Hell, Bastard* (1963), *Wild Youth* (1963), *The Life of a Prostitute* (1965), *A Generation of Tattoos* (1965), *Tokyo Drifter* (1966), *Violence Elegy* (1966) and *Branded to Kill* (1967).

There were no well-known German directors such as Herbert Achternbusch, Noever, Wim Wenders, Schroeter or even Doris Dörrie at the Hof Festival.

The only well-known director to turn up was Werner Herzog, and he only came to play football in the traditional game between "the film people" and a team from Hof, which ended in a draw.

The goal scorer in previous years was Sönke Wortmann, who two years ago came to prominence with his short-film *Fotofinish*, and who introduced his *Drei D*, the film he made to graduate from the Munich Film and TV College.

This film is about the many snares involved in shooting a film for graduation from the College.

There is more demand today for comedy than social criticism in the German film.

Women directors were more strongly represented at this year's Hof Festival than ever. Bettina Bayerl presented her new film, *Premiere*, Helma Sanders-Brahms her *Manöver*, Bettina Woernle *Der Einbruch*, and Ute Wieland *Im Jahr der Schildkröte.*

Vivian Naefe also screened her *Pizza-Express*, a light-hearted comedy which has already had audiences rolling in the aisles with laughter.

Pia Frankenberg's film *Brennende Betten* was another kind of comedy, more barbed and comic, with the director herself in the main female role and Ian Dury in the male lead.

Monika Treut's *Die Jungfrauenmaschine* was less amusing than Frankenberg's film but now and then comic. This film was an examination of romantic love as a women's sickness, carried out by a naive, carefree woman journalist, played by Ina Blum, who, like an Alice in Wonderland, is responsible for all the amusement in the film. She does not leave out a lesbian strip-tease club in San Francisco.

The themes in Monika Treut's film go to waste to a considerable extent, but the camera work by Elfi Mikesch is captivating.

Some of the films mentioned will soon be available for general distribution and will then be the subject of discussion in detail.

The contributions from France, *Das Leben ist ein langer, ruhiger Fluss* by Etienne Chatiliez, *Lärm und Wut* by Jean-Claude Brisseau and *Versteckte Leidenschaft* by Mehdi Charef, the director of *Tee in Harem des Archimedes*, have found distributors, for instance.

From Finland came From Russia with Rock, directed by Marjaana Mykkänen, the first full-length, extremely informative film about the rock scene in the Soviet Union.

The film revolves round the "Nautilus Pompilius" group from Sverdlovsk in Siberia. The film shows the group's emergence from the Soviet Union's underground culture, its participation in Russia's "Rockpanorama," which was continuously *delayed and was eventually* the largest rock festival ever in Russia, lasting seven days and including 50 bands. Bands without official status were heard at this festival for the first time. The film shows how the group came to be the *most popular in* Moscow and later in the country as a whole, and then how the group members returned to Siberia for the sake of their independence. The interviews with them in the film, their public appearances, their sound and their songs "Striptease," "Bound with One

Continued on page 15



Helma Sanders-Brahms' *Manöver* was one of several films made by women shown at Hof. (Photo: Hofer Filmtage)

The face that fits the bill emerges after 60 years

Max von Sydow has a face that it is hard to place, even though it has been displayed, larger than life, on posters for years.

It is a face that reveals nothing. It is disciplined. It seeks to disguise the man himself under the polish and good reason of the average person.

Only now, at 60, does the real face of *this famous Swedish actor seem to become* evident.

This is somewhat surprising for at the 30th Nordic Film Festival in Lübeck Max von Sydow's name was unexpectedly not top of the bill, for this time round the Scandinavian star at Lübeck was Ingmar Bergman, who is this year 70.

The festival includes a retrospective devoted to his work.

But Max von Sydow, one of Bergman's *most famous actors, was* also included in the programme of course. But his presence was mainly felt in a film that exposed him, as we can see now, just as much as it exposed its director.

Das Gesicht dates from 1958. It is a romantic, veiled parable of the despised comedian. Von Sydow conceals himself as a tormented human being behind the mask of the false beard and wig of the magician, trained in the demonic arts. Who would *have thought that von Sydow could perform* so movingly and not depict his own artistic suffering? He was also the high point of the festival. *Apart from the* Bergman retrospective, which included the still imposing trilogy of *As in a Glass Darkly, Light in Winter* and *Silence*, the festival was officially opened by the film that won at Cannes and created such a furore, *Pelle, the Conqueror.*

This film, by the Dane Bille August, is an adaptation of the first volume of the four-volume saga by Martin Anderson-Nexö. Pelle is taken by his ageing father, Lasse, played by von Sydow, *from poverty-stricken* Sweden to the relative prosperity of Denmark. The film is nothing less than a act of homage to von Sydow.

Von Sydow discovered in this film a truely great humorous representation of man, free from Bergman's obsessions and intellectualism, which no more needs good *reason or demonic spirit as a magic cap.* If *Pelle, the Conqueror* is not a great film, von Sydow is great in it. But he did not *show a similar mastery in the first film he* has directed, *Katinka*, which was presented in Lübeck. His film version of the famous Hermann Bang novella *Am Weg* suffered, despite its elegiac charm, from long-windedness.

The Swedish contribution to the Festival, *Director Andrei Tarkowski*, honoured the great Russian film metaphysician, who died in 1986.

The film is a report by his collaborator Michal Leszczlowski, who was with Tarkowski for the shooting of his last film in Sweden, *Das Opfer*. Tarkowski encouraged Leszczylowski in his passionate devotion to filming.

This film is a wonderful, illuminating document, which will touch the heart of every Tarkowski fan.

Tarkowski acknowledge an intellectual relationship to Bergman, which made this film from Sweden all the more important for the Lübeck Festival with its retrospective on Bergman's work. The work of these two film greats shone. Jan Troell from Sweden was so didactic in his three-hour-long opus *Märchenland*, which attacks the destruction of nature and other sins, that one became irritated.

Stine Korst's film *Willkommen im Leben*, about the fate of handicapped children was convincing in its ideological honesty.

Overall at the festival, there was didacticism here, and honesty there, but what about a little more artistry?

Kläre Warnecke

(Die Welt, Bonn, 8 November 1988)



Greatness at work, Max von Sydow (right) in *Pelle the Conqueror.* (Photo: Nordische Filmtage)

■ THE ARTS

Cartoonist Uli Stein steps out of a footballing shadow

*Cartoonist Uli Stein lives in an in*conspicuous bungalow just outside Hanover.

A Porsche and a Mercedes stand in front of the house, but that is nothing out of the ordinary in this district. The burglar alarm is simply evidence that the occupant of the bungalow is more anxious than other people.

Only the notice on the garden gate shows that Stein lives here. In a typical *play on words the notice warns visitors* to beware of a little dog — the play is in the German on "bisschen" and "bissig", meaning vicious.

There is no name on the door, no intercom. He receives guests as if they were friends who have come to tea. "Go straight into the living-room. Would you like coffee?"

He is 41. His blond hair hangs down his neck. In his attitude he mimicks the *unspoiled young man from next-door.* He is modest, friendly and amusing and has no airs and graces.

He chattered away guilelessly, recklessly, putting his visitor at ease. "Now, *what do you want to know about me?"* he asked.



Nothing eccentric about him ... Stein at work.

A lot is already known. He is one of the most successful and well-known cartoonists in the Federal Republic. Perhaps his work is just a passing fashion, but at present it cannot be ignored: his cuddly comic animals such as the mischievous cat, the cheeky mouse, the dog and now the penguin — and his comical people with a long conk for a nose and fried-egg-like eyes.

Over the past five years he has used these characters to illustrate five books, 200 designs for cards and any number of gift articles from note-paper and coffee mugs to playing cards.

Stein is seen every week in the radio and television magazine *Hör Zu* and in the women's magazine *Freundin*. In a conveyor-belt process, he produces calendar pictures. He does not know how *he does it all, for the day has only* 24 hours even for him.

Has success really had no effect on him? "None," he said forcefully and with an innocent look.

He admits that he now enjoys the luxury of two secretaries, a charwoman, and any number of lawyers, who ensure that his copyrights are not infringed.

Nevertheless Stein, in jeans and with a day-old beard, maintained that his lifestyle had remained very much the same.

Hannoversche Allgemeine

"How could it be different? I get up at nine, sit at my desk for more than 12 hours and fall into bed at night dog-tired," *he said.*

There is nothing eccentric about him, no extravagant furnishings. He has indeed remained realistic. The living-room was embarrassingly cheerful. The kitchen niche with a dining bar was spotlessly clean. Everything was fashionably black and sober.

Even his work table in his office looked as if he were a civil servant. There were a couple of felt-tip pens scattered about, but he tells guests that they are there as an alibi.

He has made a notice which reads: "Don't remove. The press is coming." This is for his cleaning lady who, before every interview, has a mania for tidying up. He does this so that people from the press discover just a little inspired chaos.

No matter how guileless he appears, Uli Stein knows just how to sell himself. He does it with a mixture of endearing naivity and a powerful dose of flirtatiousness.

He once wanted to be a journalist, but his career adviser drove away this fancy notion. He was scornfully advised not to go in for such an unremunerative way to earn a living.

He ended up at Hanover's teacher training college to train to become a teacher. He did not have much enthusiasm for going through "such stupid stuff," so after a couple of semesters he just did not show up any more.

He hustled his way into jobs as a press photographer and eventually got a place in Saarlandischer Rundfunk, the radio *station in the Saar. For eight years he put* out a nonsense programme for this station. Then he began to draw — badly as he now admits — and slowly developed his typical comic characters.

Drinking coffee and in a coquettish


Continued on page 16

ICH MUSS MAL!

The Stein penguin says: I have to go to the lavatory. (Photos: Viola Hauschild)



Loriot looks at the diplomatic corps. (Photo: Museum)



Recipe for hippo in wine . . . Loriot. (Photo, Archives)

A caricaturist shows how it all went to the dogs

Loriot, whose real name is Bernhard Viktor von Bülow, is the most popular caricaturist in Germany.

An exhibition of his work, entitled simply "Loriot," has opened in the Wilhelm Busch Museum in Hanover to celebrate his 65th birthday.

It includes 200 items illustrating his work as author, director, actor and film-*maker.*

He was born on 12 November 1923 in Brandenburg on the River Havel, now in East Germany.

"My timing was all wrong," he later said about his baptism. He was laid in a pram with a little girl who was also to be baptised.

He said that no-one had prepared for *the dual baptism from a "space or moral* point of view." Vicco, his nickname as a child, lay *there waiting on events.*

"It is possible that my partner's lack of charm or the dignity of the situation shocked me. *I* was afraid however, my failure then was based on my prudishness. The weight of superannuated, western educational ideas might have played a role in this."

This episode, recalled in the catalogue, might be fact or fancy, but it touches on one of Loriot's leitmotives: *from the bashfulness in the cradle to the* clumsy old-timer, who as a mature elderly man, still trembles before his mother. *His film Ödipussi* is documented in the Busch Museum exhibition from the first outline of the scene sequences to work on the final film script and the film stills. The catalogue includes a biography of the notable events in the life of Vicco von Bülow, prepared by Herwig Guratzsch. He lost his mother when he was six. He had been separated from her two years before and put in the care of his grandmother. In 1932 his father remarried and in 1938 the family moved from Berlin to Stuttgart. "As a passionate opera fan I worked as an extra for the Stuttgart Staatsoper. I learned by heart page after page of Shakespeare monologues," he recalled when he was awarded the "Golden Removal Van" in Stuttgart in 1983.

His love of the theatre was later fulfilled with his productions of Friedrich von Flotow's opera, *Martha*, (1985-1986) at the Staatsoper in Stuttgart and Carl Maria von Weber's *Der Freischütz at the Ludwigsburg Castle* Festival this year.

The Loriot Exhibition, that will only be staged in Hanover, gives an insight into his work in various media, according to Guratzsch.

It begins at the point where Loriot himself began, with drawings.

The Exhibition shows some of his early work and a reader's letter, now

RHEINISCHE POST

faded, a "long-standing" subscriber from Constance.

"Leave out the damned pictures of *dogs from your publication (illustrated* weekly *Stern*).

They certainly don't do anything to raise the standard of the magazine." This was written on 4 June 1953.

His first book appeared that year, published by Diogenes-Verlag, Zürich, *Auf den Hund gekommen* (Gone to the dogs).

He has been with this publishing house since the beginning. More than three million copies of his books have been sold.

His uninterrupted rise to become the Federal Republic's most popular caracaturist began in 1967 with his TV series *Cartoon*, in which he was both script-writer and main actor, and with his animated films, *Cartoon*, *Stanwell* and *Wum*, along with a second TV series in 1976, produced with Evelyn Hamann.

In the Busch Museum there are "true stories" alongside cooking recipes (Hippopotamus in Burgundy wine).

Other items give an insight into fine manners, about child education or record the encounter made by Herr Müller-Lüdenscheid in his hotel-room bath: surprisingly he discovers that the bathtub is already occupied.

Loriot places conks, conspicuous noses, with relative ease on his characters. The Hanover exhibition shows Loriot placing this foreign protrusion on his portraits of Friedrich Nietzsche, Thomas Mann, Arno Schmidt, Wagner and Goethe.

Ursula Bunte

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 24 October 1988)

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

Damaged ozone layer and the hothouse effect: scientists seek solutions

There have been some dramatic scenarios painted about what might happen if such environmental phenomena as the disintegrating ozone layer and the hothouse effect are not stopped: Cologne *cathedral under water; perspiring penguins* padding round an ice-free South Pole. Scientists are less graphic but their warnings carry more weight. Caro*line Möhring went along to an interna*tional meeting of scientists in Hamburg to find out more. Her story appeared in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

In the past century mean temperatures have increased by 0.6° C, and if we carry on as we have been doing the increase in temperature over the next century is likely to be between 3° and 9° C.

Man seems to be to blame for this phenomenon. Growing quantities of "climate-effective trace gases" — substances that have an enormous effect on the climate even in minute amounts — appear to find their way into the atmosphere as a result of human activity.

The most important and best-known trace gas is carbon dioxide (CO_2), which made life on Earth in its present form possible despite accounting for only about 0.03 per cent of the atmosphere.

It and atmospheric steam ensure that the *mean temperature* on planet Earth is not -18° but -15° C. Both gases absorb part of the heat emitted by the Earth's surface and reflect it back — like the glass *roof of a hothouse.*

This hothouse effect is compounded when the carbon dioxide count in the atmosphere increases, and that has been the case for *200* years.

The main cause has been the steadily increasing consumption of fossil fuel: coal, oil and natural gas.

Their combustion currently releases roughly five billion tonnes of CO_2 a year into the atmosphere — a tonne of carbon dioxide for virtually every man, woman and child in the world.

In industrialised countries such as the United States the annual per capita output is roughly six tonnes; in developing countries such as India a mere 20 kilos.

The destruction of the tropical rain forests, which store large quantities of CO_{2}, also releases carbon dioxide, about half of which stays in the atmosphere, the remainder finding its way into the ocean.

Whether it will keep doing so, given the *higher carbon dioxide count* and warmer water, no-one really knows. The role of the oceans is one of the major unknown factors in all climate forecasts.

This extra carbon dioxide is not the only factor that contributes toward the hothouse effect. Scientists now say other trace gases play roughly as important a role. They too are generated by human activity, find their way into the atmosphere, stay there for some time and impede the heat radiation that used to pass unhindered between the "atmospheric window" of water and carbon dioxide.

One of these substances is methane. It is generated in garbage tips and defective natural gas pipelines, in swamps, paddy fields and ruminants' stomachs.

There are about 1.2 billion cattle in the world, which is roughly four times as many as a century ago. They alone generate 55 million tonnes of methane a year.

The atmospheric methane count still seems small, but each extra molecule has the same effect on the Earth's temperature as 32 molecules of carbon dioxide. Methane is estimated to contribute nearly *20* per cent toward the hothouse effect.

Chlorofluorohydrocarbons (CFC), the spraycan gas that has gained a bad reputation as the scourge of the ozone layer, are estimated to be almost as devastating.

Each extra CFC molecule has the same effect on the climate as 15,000 molecules of carbon dioxide. The CFC count is increasing 5 per cent a year.

While long-life chlorofluorohydrocarbons are busy destroying the ozone layer in the stratosphere, at an altitude of over 15km (nine miles), ozone is on the increase in lower atmospheric strata, with equally undesirable consequences.

In the troposphere ozone has a toxic effect on flora, fauna and man; it also heightens the hothouse effect. Nitric oxides play *a leading role in generating it; road trans*port, coal-fired power stations and fertiliser plant are felt to be the culprits.

Laughing gas, another nitric oxide, contributes a further four per cent *toward the* hothouse effect. It is generated when nitrogen-based fertilisers decompose in the soil and hovers in the atmosphere for between 20 and 100 years.

This wide range of influences cannot readily be equated or identified with natural fluctuations in the climate. But over the past century three changes are felt to have gone hand in hand:

- the carbon dioxide count has increased *from 0.028 to 0.035 per cent;*
- mean atmospheric temperature has increased by between 0.5 and 0.9 degrees centigrade;
- *the sea-level* is between 10 and 20 centimetres higher.

Many scientists feel the recent proliferation of "natural disasters" is a harbinger *of climatic change. They include extreme* aridity in otherwise rainsoaked areas of Indonesia and heavy rainfall in the deserts of Peru, years of drought in south-east Africa, devastating forest fires in Asia and tropical hurricanes in unusual locations.

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Some scientists say these are signs of an alarming upset to the atmospheric balance. Others are more reserved in their judgement, saying no distinction can yet be drawn between natural and anthropogenous causes.

All are worried that any further increase in the quantity of climate-effective trace gas in the atmosphere may have far-reaching consequences.

Detailed forecasts of these consequences *are difficult, not to say impossi*ble. Climate models are drawn up in an attempt to simulate the complex goings-on, but many of the conceivable inter-relationships are not well enough known.

The factor that can be most reliably forecast is the mean increase in world temperature. In all scientific probability it will increase by between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees in the next century if the carbon dioxide count in the atmosphere doubles.

When other trace gases are taken into account the increase could well be between three and nine degrees centigrade.

The more complex and exact the climate model is, the greater the estimated increase in temperature has been shown as a rule to be.

Scientists are accordingly worried that the actual temperature increase will be greater than has so far been assumed.

Forecasting further consequences is even *harder still. The* temperature increase will presumably vary by region and season. At the poles temperatures are expected to increase more, especially in winter, than at the equator.

Temperatures are expected to increase more in the northern hemisphere than in the southern. Rainfall is expected to increase all round, but it will increase mainly in the tropics where it is already humid, whereas many areas will grow even more arid.

The arid zones of northern Africa, Arabia, Central Asia and the southern United States may head several hundred kilometres north and transform what are now densely-populated, fertile temperature zones round the Mediterranean, in North America and in the south of the Soviet Union into sub-tropical arid zones.

The most devastating change is anticipated in Scandinavia, Siberia and northern Canada, where the permafrost line *may shift north, melting part of the ice.*

The sea-level will probably increase by up to 1.50 metres (five feet) if the Antarctic shelf ice melts. The climate in general is *expected to be less stable and more liable* to be hit by disasters.

Politicians have now begun to wonder how to stop or at least slow the hothouse *effect.*

At the end of last year the German Bundestag set up a commission of inquiry to look into the topic.

After work that has gained *international* acclaim as exemplary it has now submitted a first interim report in which scientists and members of all parliamentary parties make joint recommendations.

They feel there is an urgent need to ensure a drastic reduction in CFC gas output, which has a twofold effect, both damaging the ozone layer and contributing toward the hothouse effect.

A first international agreement has been concluded on this point, the Montreal protocol, signed after 10 years in preparation.

The Bundestag commission of inquiry feels, as do many others, that measures must urgently be stepped up. Halving the output of long-life CFC gas does not halve its effect; its atmospheric count will continue to increase, but at a slightly slower pace.

A global reduction in carbon dioxide output is also felt to be urgently necessary. It is likely to prove much more difficult.

In Toronto last July agreement was reached at the international climate conference on a demand for the industrialised countries to reduce their contribution toward the *higher carbon dioxide count* by at least 20 per cent.

That could be only accomplished by using energy more economically and by dispensing with fossil fuels.

Even more drastic measures were demanded at the Hamburg international congress on climate trends. The CO_2 output must be reduced by at least 30 per cent by the turn of the century and by 60 per cent by the year 2015.

The Hamburg conference also made it clear how hard it will be to bring about any effective reduction in carbon dioxide output.

The debate can all too easily degenerate into a dispute between representatives of coal or atomic energy and advocates of renewable energy resources.

Views also differ in North and South, East and West.

The Third World countries are expected to be hit particularly hard by climate changes, but in many developing countries these forecasts and appeals for a more economic use of energy are felt to be a new subterfuge devised by the rich countries to forestall the development of the poor.

Besides, few people worry about tomorrow when they are fighting for sheer survival today. J. M. Dave, an Indian scientist, outlined the dilemma from his country's viewpoint vividly in Hamburg.

India, he said, had set itself a number of *targets with a view to improving* living standards. If they were to be reached, the carbon dioxide output would be increased by 150 per cent.

If all technical means of energy-saving were to be used and renewable energy sources to be harnessed this growth rate might possibly be reduced by 20 per cent.

That would still mean India's CO_2 output would more than double, and India is already ninth in the world's carbon dioxide output league.

Even though some of them are starting to realise the long-term drawbacks, many developing countries fail to see how they can afford not to fell the tropical rain forests.

In the Soviet Union, currently the world's second-largest producer of carbon dioxide, long-term benefits are expected to result from the hothouse effect.

Moscow climatologist M. I. Budyko told the Hamburg congress a further increase in atmospheric CO_2 could have desirable consequences.

More heat and more carbon dioxide might increase the productivity of the Earth's vegetation cover. Crop yields would increase and large, hitherto uninhabited areas, such as Siberia, would become fertile.

*In the long term the distribution of rain*fall would probably improve, he said. An unfavourable interim consequence such as the present drought in the United States *was a drawback that had to be accepted.*

It could even be cut short by increasing the carbon dioxide output. An ideal climate could then have been established within a few decades, and human *intellect* should succeed in providing protection from any further increase in the sea-level.

Mr Budyko admitted there *was risk of* overshooting the mark and *ending with a* climate that was no longer conducive to human development.

But that would probably take longer than a century, so there was ample time in which to agree on counter-measures.

He already had one suggestion to make. Sulphur could be sprayed into the atmosphere by plane and burnt. The resulting aerosol gases would counteract the hothouse effect.

This Soviet vision may not have been shared by others, but it shows how difficult it will be to coordinate activity as long as anyone even feels he may stand to benefit.

Scientists are accordingly wondering how to adapt agriculture to climate changes that may be inevitable. Yet inter*national agreements are still felt by many* to be desirable. The United Nations is keen to take up the issue too.

But action seems urgently needed to go with the fine words spoken at one conference after another.

Action is called for, if only "for safety's sake." If the forecasts are accurate, it will otherwise be too late.

Caroline Möhring

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 14 November 1988)

■ PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE

40 years since doctor who broke ranks opened clinic

The name of Alexander Mitscherlich was despised by many of his fellow doctors in Germany up to his death in 1982. The man who put German psychoanalysis back on the international map after the war was never forgiven for exposing to the world the extent of the medical profession's involvement in human experiments and euthanasia programmes during the Nazi era. Mitscherlich founded the clinic for psychosomatic medicine at Heidelberg University in 1950, a trail-blazing development. The university rejected a suggestion in 1984, *two years after his death, that the* clinic be named after him. Their reason: his contribution to medicine had not been significant enough. Reiner Straub *wrote this story about the beginnings of* the clinic and the state of psychosomatic medicine today for the *Mannheimer Morgen.*

Walter Bräutigam, retiring head of the Heidelberg clinic for psychosomatic medicine at Heidelberg University says the unit is regarded as "a provocation".

"We are regarded as somewhat eccentric and unreal in contrast with traditional medicine." He has headed the clinic for 20 years after taking over from the founder, Alexander Mitscherlich.

After the war, Mitscherlich's efforts were energetic supported by Victor von Weizsäcker, one of the great authorities on psychosomatic medicine who was even then referring to the "the destructive character" of this type of illness. He thought in terms of it revolutionising traditional medicine.

So how was it that the clinic was founded? And what is its role today?

When Mitscherlich in 1946 began an initiative to form a department for psy*chosomatics and psychotherapy at the* university, he met strong resistance from the medical profession.

One of the most strident opponents was psychiatrist *Paul Schneider* — who feared what the effects might be on his branch of medicine. Then followed four years of argument until, on 15 April, 1950, the department opened its doors.

How had Mitscherlich got that far? For a start, he was regarded as being politically clean and therefore was able to win the trust of the occupying American forces. In 1945, he together with Karl Jaspers, Alfred Weber and others were able to reopen Heidelberg's university even though during the Third Reich it had been particularly careful to toe the Nazi party line.

In 1948 Mitscherlich established contact with Alan Gregg, who was then director of the medical department of the Rockefeller Foundation in New York and was able "with almost no effort" convince him about the importance of psychosomatic medicine.

The foundation promised to donate *half a million marks if a similar amount* were raised in Germany. It was. The resistance in Germany collapsed. Mitscherlich wrote in his autobiography that, *without the American contact, it would* have all been impossible.

Why was resistance from traditional medicine so strong? Why were scientists, who are receptive to innovation, so opposed? There were two reasons. One was the person, Mitscherlich, himself. The other was the discipline. To understand this, psychosomatics has to be looked at in the context of medical history.

Present-day medicine has its foundations in the 19th century. Above all, the speed of scientific development in the second half of the century resulted in medical practice which, through constantly improving techniques of operating and better medicines was able to substantially lengthen life expectation and improve quality of life.

But doctors were interested only in what could be seen and quantified. Every illness should as far as possible be precisely diagnosed and located without involving the persona of the patient. Out of this medicine emerged modern medicine with its technology and its equipment. But lost was a development in the relationship between doctor and patient.

Protest was inevitable. In the 1920s and 30s, a group of doctors came together in what came to be known as the Heidelberg School. Ludolf von Krehl, *Richard Siebeck and Victor von* Weizsäcker criticised the scientifically based traditional medicine and advocated their "anthropological medicine." *From now on, they said, the ill person* should be treated and not the illness.

That was provocative for the traditionalists. They saw illness as something to be treated in isolation in order to objectify it. The bio-chemical human organism should be repaired through medicines or operation. That was the ideal. It was unthinkable that, for example, diarrhoea could be caused not just by a virus but also because of the stressful effects of a patient's close relative dying.

This new view challenged this attitude. But that was only half the story.

The other half was Mitscherlich himself. *In 1938, he had come to join* Victor von Weizsäcker in the neurological department at Heidelberg. After the war, he busied himself not only with recovery following the devastation but also with a coming to terms with the past.

In 1947, he wrote: "What was done by people from our ranks, and what was not done, can only be credibly resolved in the eyes of others if we patiently investigate the reality and learn to comprehend that the terrible events belong to us as well."

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He went to Nuremberg as an observer at the war trials. He knew *then that* that wouldn't make him popular because few Germans wanted to look back at the preceding 12 years.

And indeed, when his work about the trials *(Das Diktat der Menschenverachtung)* appeared in 1947, he came under a crossfire of criticism.

Colleagues in the medical profession called him "traitor to the fatherland" and said he was "lacking awareness" of the professional status of doctors.

Why? Because Mitscherlich had revealed to the world experiments on humans and euthanasia programmes for "incurables" carried out in the Nazi era.

Not only that. He also maintained that it was not, as most doctors asserted, a mere handful of doctors who were involved in these horrors.

But in spite of it all, he succeeded in establishing his clinic in 1950 — the first of its type in Germany. In 1920 a private psychoanalyses sanatorium had been founded in Berlin; and Weizsäcker himself had in 1928 begun treating psychosomatically neurotic retired people at the Heidelberg neurological department. But Mitscherlich's clinic was the real beginning of psychosomatic treatment in this country.

It was of decisive significance. The humanism of Freud, whose writings were burnt by the Nazis, once again had got a foothold at a German university.

In the years that followed, Mitscherlich was able to put German psychoana*lysis back on the international map.* That, says Bräutigam, is one of Mitscherlich's great achievements.

In spite of Mitscherlich's undisputed *merits both as doctor and scientist, Hei*delberg refused to recognise him. It was only in 1958 that he was offered a professorship — and then without a chair.

In *1968*, he was offered a chair, but then it was too late. He had in 1967 accepted the chair of philosophy at Frankfurt.

Mitscherlich's name continued to be regarded with distaste. In 1984, Heidelberg University rejected a suggestion from Bräutigam that the clinic be named after Mitscherlich. The reason: Mitscherlich's contribution had been "insignificant".

Bräutigam observes. "One thing is certain: Mitscherlich's name will be remembered long after those who rejected the suggestion have all been forgotten."

Bräutigam, who had started working with Mitscherlich in 1950, succeeded him as head of the clinic after the founder went to Frankfurt.

The clinic expanded. More money was made available and the number of beds increased from eight to 24. A head doctor was appointed and the staff in*creased. This expansion was not only in* Heidelberg. By this time, psychosomatic medicine was developing throughout the entire country.

So, who comes to the clinic? Patients with headaches, palpitations of the heart, asthma and digestion problems are referred to its outpatients department by their house doctor if nothing organically wrong is found. About 1,200 patients a year are treated.


Patients who have no insight at all into their feelings and conflicts yet who might be psychosomatically ill are recommended for in-patient treatment. Many take the attitude: "It's my stomach that's ill, not my head." It is often easier for them to come to terms with organic reasons for being ill.

They find it easier to keep their illness at a distance in the hope that the doctor will fix "it". But psychosomatic illnesses cannot be cured with this attitude. The *patient must grapple with the problems* himself.

New ideas about therapy had to be introduced. Together with his colleagues, *Bräutigam introduced gestaltung ther*apy and concentrated movement therapy. An example shows how it worked: a woman patient used to withdraw to bed *whenever she felt depressed.* She said she didn't want to be a nuisance to anybody. But after using movement therapy, she discovered new reasons for her behaviour.

Patients need to establish contact with one another. The woman experienced for the first time how strong her need was to use the group to help her.

Through such non-verbal therapy many people are able to learn how to cope with feelings, fears and wishes, says Bräutigam. The proportion of less educated patients is rising sharply. Some patients have to be admitted because they are no longer in a position to control their own lives. A distance between them and family and friends and trusted things is necessary so that a new identity can be developed.



Spoke out about doctors' complicity in Nazi experiments . . . Alexander Mitscherlich. (Photo: Lutz Kleinhans)

But that involves risks. Bräutigam says: "My greatest fear is that the patient will say the time in the clinic was the best in his life and that everything before and after was catastrophic."

Critics from the psychoanalysis camp accuse Bräutigam of, over the past decade, gradually departing from psychoanalysis step by step and pursuing other therapies such as behaviour and family therapies. Bräutigam agrees. But he regards this as positive and in line with trends both in Germany and internationally.

He argues that many illnesses cannot *be explained by orthodox psychoanaly*sis, which insists on tracing all conflict back to early childhood.

As an example, anorexia nervosa, which has reached almost epidemic proportions among girls — was probably an adolescent development crisis and something which could be better explained through looking at certain social conditions of the modern day rather than through some conflict with its roots in early childhood.

He says that new theories have not managed to shake the fundamental psychoanalytic orientation of the clinic.

Bräutigam's successor is Michael von Rad, from Munich, who is also a psychoanalyst and neurologist. He intends continuing Bräutigam's work.

One observer says about psychosomatic medicine today: "Psychological origins of illness used to be over-accentuated. But today, psychosomatic specialists are too deferential. Often they just don't have the courage to explain a physical illness from their point of view when their opinion clashes with that of traditional medicine."

But that alone was not the problem. It was that the branch had emerged as a specialist field on its own rather than a *field of knowledge permeating all* branches of medicine. Medicine had not been revolutionised.

Attempts have lately been made to *form a psychosomatic* counselling service at other hospitals.

But Bräutigam says somewhat resignedly: "A psychosomatic specialist in intensive-care units would be desirable. But for most it is entirely dispensable."

And because there is a shortage of money, it is being saved in the psychosomatic field. Psychosomatics is indeed the anaemic child of medicine.

Reiner Straub

(Mannheimer Morgen, 2 November 1988)

■ HORIZONS

The mountain village community where the mentally ill feel at home

When Rainer says "I feel fine here", it isn't just empty words. When he went on a pilgrimage with the altar-boys from the neighbouring village, he genuinely enjoyed it and is looking forward to the next time.

He has his hands full looking after his four cows Julia, Blümchen, Almut and Tamara. He says: "They're always pleased to see me. I'm fully responsible for them, you know."

This cow-byre conversation may have the ring of real rural life, but it isn't quite the same. Rainer is mentally handicapped.

He is a 32-year-old with the mind of a child and would hardly be able to fend for himself in an outside world.

Here in Hohenroth, a village near Augsburg, he and others like him can lead natural lives and develop their personalities without feeling ostracised.

Hohenroth looks at first glance like an old-world country village from way back when fields and villages were not designed to suit agricultural machinery.

In reality the entire village was designed on a drawing-board and built 10 years ago. The villagers happily celebrated the anniversary.

The site used to be a stud where a Bavarian industrialist bred horses. The village, built in five stages, was designed to be run along the lines advocated by Rudolf Steiner, the anthroposopher, founder of the Waldorf schools and an or-

Süddeutsche Zeitung

ganic farming pioneer. The project, discussed at length beforehand, was intended to "establish living conditions in which mentally and physically handicapped people can freely but protectedly lead lives of dignity."

The aim, a prospectus about the village explained, was to encourage and promote the abilities every handicapped person retains.

We all need humane contacts, emotional warmth and personal leeway to develop our personalities, the argument ran. "We want to create the preconditions for handicapped people to live outside the confusion of the city without being under pressure and without being lonely."

There were existing examples of this concept in Sassen, near Fulda, and at Lehenhof on Lake Constance. But nowhere has it been implemented more thoroughly and on such a scale as in Hohenroth.

Even now, after a decade's work, it is still seen as an example of a new form of welfare for the handicapped, as the Bavarian government noted in a message of congratulation sent to mark the anniversary.

In Hohenroth "normal" families and their children live together with a group of between 8 and 12 handicapped people under one roof. The idea is based on, and developed from, the SOS Children's Village concept.

Each family is completely self-supporting and run on a separate budget. The "persons looked after," as the handicapped are invariably known to rule out linguistic discrimination, work during the day in the various village facilities.

The families decide who does which work. The personal abilities and inclinations of the "person looked after" is invariably the yardstick.

The government and local authority welfare departments, who are more used to closed institutions, felt uneasy about the whole idea.

When Eugen Burnus, who was then in charge of the entire village, outlined the objectives of the community, he was warned by many public officials that he would have to advertise to find "persons to be looked after."

The implication was that Hohenroth was superfluous because there were already enough welfare facilities for the handicapped.

The sceptics were disproved. There are still many more applicants to live in the village than places available.

That is hardly surprising. There are about one million mentally and emotionally handicapped people in the Federal Republic, and only 46,400 places for them in homes, plus a further 2,540 in 197 shared apartments.

In most cases the handicapped are forced to stay at home with members of their own families, which many welfare policymakers and public officials still feel is the ideal.

Eugen Burnus can appreciate this view up to a point. "That," he says, "is naturally the least expensive solution." But it pays little or no heed to the handicapped person's human dignity.

He also feels that far too little consideration is given to what is to happen to these people when their next of kin can no longer look after them for age or other reasons — or simply die.

Often enough the only option is then to confine them in a closed institution.

Hohenroth has become the centre of life for about 300 people. The village's 18 families look after 130 "persons looked after" aged between 18 and 52.

A further 13 trainees and 17 conscientious objectors lend a hand in the families and in the workshops.

The village's daily routine is governed by the principles of organic farming. About half the "persons looked after" work in the market gardens.

As the village grew, other job opportunities arose. There was a baker's, a confectioner's with a café and wholefood shop and textile-, wood- and metalworking workshops.

The village also has 130 hectares (325 acres) of pasture and 100 dairy cattle that give the milk that goes to the village dairy.

The original intention was to pay the "persons looked after" a wage for their work, as is usual in workshops for the handicapped. But this idea was soon set aside — on grounds of principle.

"If we had paid wages," Burnus says, "we would inevitably have had to introduce the productivity principle."

That is why Hohenroth, unlike many other workshops and institutions, decided from the outset not to do contract work for outside firms.

There was to be no sorting of screws or assembly of simple items. One of the hallmarks of village life in Hohenroth is that the handicapped can live in human dignity and not under stress.

Another fundamental principle was even more crucial. "The cash value of work done is not what matters," says Klaus Griemert, the head of a village family and the village community's chief cashier.

"We can give the persons looked after a feeling of being needed by others and of doing something meaningful."

Not for nothing is the emphasis on farming and market gardening. Burnus feels it to be of inestimable educational value for the handicapped to experience at first hand the fruits of their work and to see for themselves what happens to it and who benefits.

That is why Dirk Finster, the dairy manager, makes a point of taking "persons looked after" with him when he takes the village's milk, yoghurt and cheese to the market in Würzburg or to nearby wholefood stores.

"So they can see for themselves where what they have produced goes."

Everything that is produced in Hohenroth must be 100-per-cent OK, says Finster. Nothing would clash more with the basic idea than for customers to buy its produce out of a sense of charity or goodwill.

The handicapped don't want sympathy; they want to be accepted as they are. That is one of Hohenroth's maxims.

It is a point that for the most part has been taken in neighbouring Rieneck and Gemünden. Mayor Walter Höfling of Rieneck admits that there was initial unease.

"We didn't really know what Hohenroth was going to be like," he says. Now, 10 years later, Hohenroth and its villagers has close ties with both Rieneck and Gemünden.

The village café in Hohenroth helped to overcome this threshold anxiety. It has long been a firm favourite with people from neighbouring villages.

"Once they have been here," says Helmut Hiller, manager of the confectioner's, "they simply can't believe they have been eating cakes baked and served by the handicapped."

He has often heard first-time visitors say: "Why, they're perfectly ordinary people!"

So the public attitude toward Hohenroth has changed a little, which is a step forward after 10 years. The village was set up with the aim of experimenting with new ideas in psychiatry and care of the handicapped.

Its founders hoped to set new standards in much the same way as Hermann Gmeiner, founder of the SOS Children's Villages, had when he coined the slogan: "Get the children out of children's homes!"

Hohenroth, which is run by an anthroposophical association known as *Das helfende Dorf* (The Helping Village), has made it clear that new ideas cannot be tested without sound financial backing. Hermann Gmeiner's SOS Children's Village Association lent the project a helping hand.

Hohenroth was originally planned to cost roughly DM24m to build, including the cost of the land. It ended up by costing DM40m.

The SOS Children's Village Association footed the bill, and its donations

Continued on page 15

■ FRONTIERS

Free-trade port looks back on 100 years of business

The free port of Hamburg was 100 years old last month. It came into existence in October 1888 under a treaty between the German Empire of Bismarck and the city of Hamburg. Hamburg had been a city-state with its own customs controls but, under the pact, it became part of the Empire's customs zone — except for an area designated as the free port. The same year, Kaiser Wilhelm II laid the foundation stone for the collection of warehouses which became known as the Speicherstadt (warehouse city), an attractive architectural complex which still forms the most visible part of the free port area and which survived the bombing of the second world war to become a tourist attraction. The 16 square kilometres of free port has a working population of 40,000 including 800 customs officers who process 12,000 ships a year. This story was written by Karsten Plog for the Berlin daily, *Der Tagesspiegel*.

Hamburg's free port has just celebrated its 100th anniversary. An accord with Bismarck's new German Empire was signed on 25 May 1881 and came into force some seven years later to create the customs-free area on 15 October 1888.

Hamburg, which until then had been independent of the Empire's customs system, became integrated into it — apart from part of the harbour known as the free port.

Here, goods are unloaded for trans-shipment without having to go through customs processing. There is no limit on quantity to be trans-shipped nor for how long. Vessels coming and leaving do not have to report to customs.

A giant container ship coming up the Elbe with a pilot on board makes for a container terminal in the free port. A customs launch on patrol on the Elbe ignores it.

And later, when the tugs have eased the big ship into its berth, no one in the green uniform of the customs service comes on board to check the cargo.

Customs only take an interest in goods which are moved out of the free port into the customs zone.

The free port covers about 16 square kilometres. It is a port within Hamburg's port and on the land side is surrounded by a three-metre high fence. There are customs offices on the main roads and on the rail routes leading out of the area.

Control posts oversee other exits which are mainly used by the 40,000 people who work in the port,

The free port has shipyards which have survived the massive cutback in shipbuilding along the North German coast. Here, vessels can be built, converted, improved, re-equipped and even broken-up vessels without any customs involvement.

The free port is appreciated today — but 100 years ago, influential circles in Hamburg opposed it strongly.

In the Middle Ages the whole of Hamburg was a kind of free port. Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa granted Hamburg merchants rights of free trade and exemption from customs duties up to the Elbe estuary in 1189.

Only merchandise which did not belong to Hamburg merchants was liable for duty. This applied up to the middle of the last century, although ultimately there were a large number of exceptions.

During the 19th century Hamburg developed into becoming the leading German port and attempts by cities such as Lüneburg, Harburg, Buxtehude and Stade to nibble away at Hamburg's privileges came to nothing.

The citizens of Hamburg tried to avoid as far as possible having to join the largest ever customs union on German soil, with the call for free trade which was equated with the existence of a free port in Hamburg.

But as the customs question threatened to become a national problem the citizens of Hamburg were threatened with becoming isolated.

In addition there were jarring differences of opinion among Hamburg merchants themselves about the customs question.

On the one hand there were firms which were mainly involved in foreign trade and who had a considerable say on the Hamburg stock exchange and in the chamber of trade. They did not want to rock the boat as regards the status of the free port.

But there was at the time a considerable and continuous increase in domestic trade. The trade barriers of neighbouring states directly at Hamburg's gateways became on increasing obstacle to this trade.

Firms strove to become absorbed into the larger customs union on German soil. Important industrial sectors, such as the tobacco industry with 3,000 workers, left the Hamburg area.

Chancellor Otto von Bismarck used the differences between Hamburg and its neighbours, as well as the differences within the city itself, to stimulate progress towards integration without neglecting the interests of the city as a whole.

Bismarck stepped up his pressure. Secret negotiations were entered into. Eventually Johannes G.A. Versmann, then a senator and later mayor, came up with a solution favourable to Hamburg: the city itself was integrated into the customs zone of the Empire, but a free port, capable of development, would remain untouched.

The accord came into force in October 100 years ago. A few days later, on 29 October 1888, the new heart of the free port, was completed, the newly, brick-built, beautiful *Speicherstadt*, (Warehouse City).

The ground for these warehouses was levelled out in an old section of the city where there were half-timbered houses and canals.

More than 24,000 people were compulsorily resettled, including many port workers and traders and tradesmen who earned a living from the port.

Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had ascended the throne only a few months before, laid the keystone to this sector of the *Speicherstadt* on 29 October 1888. The emperor rode in a carriage beside Versmann, who was now Hamburg's mayor. No great celebrations were planned for the 100th anniversary of the free port. This will be done next year when Hamburg itself celebrates its 800th anniversary.

The celebrations will then include the whole port. The date of the establishment of the port of Hamburg is not as certain as the date when the accord for the establishment of the free port came into effect. But a couple of years do not matter all that much in a port as old as Hamburg.

Karsten Plog

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 15 October 1988)

The waterway at right separates Hamburg city from the free port on the left. The 19th century warehouses run up the middle of the picture. (Photo: HHLA)

Hof festival

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Chain" and "Goodbye America," are all what you would call a hit. And just a little piece of perestroika.

Another film in which the music is just as important as the visual images, and both were wild and powerful, came from New Zealand. Vincent Ward brought his *Vigil* to Hof in 1984. His *The Navigator* is a collision of two worlds, the 14th and the 20th centuries. It is a cinematic tour de force.

And the fans of American horror films and productions with nerve-tickling special effects did not come off too badly. There was a double bill on Saturday evening with *Nightmare on Elm Street 4 — The Dream Master* with the indestructible cinema character Freddy Krueger. And *Phantasm II*, again by Don Coscarelli. *Amazon Women on the Moon* on the other hand was a collection of old curios, 20 short-films.

The American Way by Maurice Phillips from Britain was also a wild production. A couple of freaked-out American Vietnam veterans operate the pirate radio station "SM-TV" from an ancient, converted B 29 bomber.

They beam torrid music clips, obscene cut-ups and political statements into regular TV programmes to torpedo the election campaign of the super-right-wing Mrs Willa Westinghouse, running for the presidency. Dennis Hoper is captain of the crew.

The most beautiful film from and about America was the first film Martin Scorsese made, *Who's that Knocking at My Door*, dating from 1968, produced in black and white.

It deals with his argument with Roman Catholicism and is full of experiments in form and has Harvey Keitel playing the main role of a young Italian-American. Harvey Keitel plays the part of Judas in Scorsese's latest film *The Last Temptation of Christ*.

Christian Winterfeldt

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 3 November 1988)

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are still relied on to run Hohenroth, which has an annual budget of DM6m.

Four million marks are received in social security allowances, a further DM1m is earned by selling Hohenroth produce.

"If demand were the criterion," says Günter Kalteis, financial manager of the SOS Children's Village Association in Munich, "we could definitely build 10 Hohenroths in the Federal Republic." But projects of this kind cannot be financed at all easily. Now, after 10 years' experience of Hohenroth, a similar facility is to be set up for about 30 mentally and emotionally handicapped people in Bockum, Lower Saxony.

Christian Schneider

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 25 October 1988)

Uli Stein

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manner he claimed that he could not really draw. The rules of perspective were not for him. He goes in for smart ideas and in this area he is very confident.

He does not accept the objection that he draws in a cute manner. He jumped up as if he were stung by a tarantula and brought out one of his books of cartoons.

Vorsicht, Steinschlag, displayed Stein in a very macabre mood. He proudly says that he had received threatening letters because of the book.

He defended his enthusiasm for black humour, saying: "You can't eat chocolate pudding all the time. You have to get your teeth into a steak occasionally."

He is certainly very rich, even if he laughingly maintains that he is at best a "fan millionaire."

Stein enjoys success. He does not fear that his popularity will suddenly come to an end. He is not yet through with the characters he has created, and expressed childish delight that he had seen his mouse pasted on a car that overtook him.

He also said that he was no longer mistaken for his namesake, the footballer Uli Stein (former Hamburg goalkeeper who has played for the German national team).

At his first autographing session in 1983 a crowd of young football fans came with footballs expecting them to be signed by goalkeeper Stein.

Now the situation is reversed. Goalkeeper Stein was recently asked when he was giving autographs to draw a couple of amusing mice on the leather ball.

The cartoonist is now *the* Uli Stein. As such he is indifferent over what people write about him. At the end of our interview he said jokingly, "Just make sure it's Uli with one l."

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 1 November 1988)